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Take It, Leave It, Fold It: 
Playing with Raymond Federman
CAMELIA ELIAS 
TO WRITE would be fi rst of all TO QUOTE. The writer would not be the one who 
listens to a voice from within, but rather the one who quotes, who puts language into 
quotes, who both sets if oﬀ  and calls it to himself, who in a word, designates it as 
language.
–  Federman, Critifi ction
We are on the threshold of celebrating writer Raymond Federman’s 80th 
birthday. Those familiar with Federman’s writings will agree with us that 
this is a gift  in itself, especially since Federman is still prolifi c and writes 
prose, poetry, and criticism that is as interesting as in his early experimen-
tal days that go back to the 60s. If one knows Federman well, however, 
one will grant us that he gets bett er and bett er. Federman himself would 
concur. 
While the present publication is not intended as a Festschrift  as such – 
although any writing on Federman can be considered a celebration in itself 
– it aims to introduce the reader to aspects in Federman’s writing that have 
become classics. However, insofar as these concepts are dynamic, they can 
be said to produce fresh, relevant, engaging, and at times personally in-
volved readings. In other words, Federman at 80 keeps it simple and urges 
us on to consider what is important. 
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What one discovers in Federman’s simplicity is fi rst and foremost a de-
sire to be generous. What is important to him is to give readers an experi-
ence that they can really think about. Within this mindset he thus wants to 
appeal to all readers if given the chance. Which brings me to introducing 
the fi rst keyword that concerns his writings: chance. It is by pure chance 
that he survived the Holocaust aft er his whole family died in the camps; it 
is by pure accident that he became a professor of literature; and it is by 
pure hazard that he became a writer of variations over the same theme: his 
loss, and what might have happened. In the face of death, obviously noth-
ing would have happened. As he did not participate in the collective act of 
dying, his fi rst responsibility towards the ones who have become memo-
ries – and whom he refers to as “the potentials” when he does not render 
them graphically as XXXX – was then to turn to writing and say something 
exactly about potential. 
But Federman did this in a somewhat inverse order. It is not him who 
chose the event to put into words, but words elected him. He asked him-
self questions that go like this: how was it possible that a French Jew who 
came to America in the 40s turned writer because he found words “sexy”? 
He oft en provided an immediate answer, which can be rendered like this: 
words found him “sexy” in turn. The fact that there was a symmetrical 
relation between word and writer on a seductive level gave Federman a 
ground on which to consolidate his position as a writer vis-à-vis the stories 
that inspired or informed his own existence. As the story goes now, he is “a 
fucking good writer”. This is the story of his life, and he sticks with it. 
What I fi nd priceless in Federman’s writing is the fact that not only does 
he invent new categorical terms which we can use to think about the space 
of literature – such as critifi ction (to bridge criticism and creativity), surfi c-
tion (to bridge the now and tomorrow, or the man and his morrow, as one 
might also put it) and precipice (to bridge gaps and gallows) – but he also 
plays with literature in the very sense of the word. He always banks on 
creativity and is never afraid that it might go bankrupt. If one bears in 
mind that chance has potential inherent in it, then the ground for playing 
games is laid. Thus Federman plays games, creates games, and invites his 
readers to consider the meaning of winning streaks through writing. Inso-
far as his premise always rests on the commonsensical fact that playing 
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games is more fun than frustration, his writings suggest that there is no 
way in which even the saddest event could not be rendered in terms that 
elicit a lot of laughter if writt en about in this context.
His writings are always populated with the strangest characters, who 
do and say the most hilarious things about the most serious things. They 
talk a lot, reveal a lot about themselves and the world in which they live, 
and they are always clever enough to recognize the world for what it is: a 
place where originality is embedded in “pla(y)giarizing.” If one were to 
describe Federman in one word, one would have to say, fun. Federman’s 
biggest insight is that any creative act that involves the making of the game 
in the image of the other requires a double play that relies on the invitation 
to take it or leave it. Playing the other by copying the other’s moves is what 
enables Federman to raise metaphors and idiomatic expressions such as 
“take or leave it” and “double or nothing” to their indexical value. In a 
game you can’t show too much, but you can talk incessantly. Thus these 
expressions get the privilege to title Federman’s books. In their certainty – 
it’s either this or that – such titles have the function to destabilize the hesi-
tant reader, but ultimately they always win her over. 
Where I fi nd Federman most generous is in his trusting the reader to go 
with him – and learn. What one learns are lessons such as these, for ex-
ample, from Double or Nothing: “That’s the problem with talking too much. 
Eventually you reveal yourself. But when you don’t talk you become a 
suspiciously suspicious character.”
In the present volume four talkers att empt to undo the “suspiciously 
suspicious character” with view to grounding Federman’s work in its own 
desired fl oating and fl ight from the merely consistently brilliant, phenom-
enal, and always clever writing. Federman’s idea is that any writing should 
have a solid dose of banality in it, lest it should get too high on the horse. 
The four essays have their own histories. They all spring from a work-
shop panel at a conference in Karlstad that Bent Sørensen and I organized 
some years ago, on haunted writing. We invited two of our students, who 
have since completed their educations with most brilliant theses either on 
the man himself, Federman, or on postmodern issues that par excellence 
take their fl ight in some of Federman’s theory, particularly critifi ction. We 
set some rules in advance. The demand was – as any good game goes – that 
if we should fail to impress the people in the audience, then perhaps we 
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should devise instead a method of haunting them thereaft er. The reader 
will soon discover for herself which self-imposed task the essays have 
managed to accomplish best in their own individual way: to haunt, silence, 
seduce, prophesy the future, or in truly Federmanesque fashion, fuck it all 
up.
As we all, however, have had a good master in Federman, the strength 
of this volume is to be found in its refl ecting a tight proximity between the 
reader (of Federman) and the writer (on Federman). But every good thing 
comes at a price. What we have paid for in our aim to achieve this proxim-
ity is a whole lot of overlapping. The reader will discover that we all tend 
to quote the same Federman books or other same texts, but this chance is 
something we have welcomed. In fact the last two essays in the volume 
have more consciously played with using the same texts in order to test 
precisely the validity and value of variation against the background of 
haunted writing – when one thinks of haunting in general terms, if the 
ghost is identifi ed, then it is so not because of its ability to stir variation but 
to create the same (just think of the motif of the doppelgänger). 
The angles and takes on Federman are thus diﬀ erent and hopefully re-
vealing of precisely that combination between the banal and the brilliant, 
yet all in good balance and binge. The fi rst essay (Amos) takes the reader 
through Federman’s narrative strategies of concrete prose and frame-
breaking, and the second (Christensen) picks up the narrative strategy 
thread through a discussion of hypothesis. The third (Sørensen) can be 
said to introduce the notion of culture through strategic and hypothetical 
memory, while the fourth (Elias) takes potentiality through stages of the 
immemorial that are informed by conjuring laughter at the gates of dawn. 
Here the operative demand, “Open Sesame!” is articulated through the 
mouths of virtual agents in cyberspace. This last essay is also longer than 
the others. There is a reason for that. While the ideas expressed rely on 
formulations articulated at the Karlstad conference, the aim now is to show 
how such ideas can be transposed into a world where the ghost is not only 
in the book, but also in the machine. So we are twice as haunted, twice as 
vibrated. 
The volume ends with an inédit surprise in the form of an epilogue that 
shows Federman at his best: when he cares for his readers, and when he 
instructs them by lett ing them actively participate in the intellectual game 
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in which the established rules are those meant to show that personal his-
tory is only as extravagant as we turn it into. The epilogue is an exchange 
between Federman and myself on a private basis. I was invited last year to 
give a talk at Babes-Bolyai University in Cluj where the topic was fi rst per-
son plural narrators in Federman’s fi ction. Before I presented my draft , I 
shared it with Federman who oﬀ ered in return a most astonishing piece of 
text. This text, while highly personal, and thus very moving in its thrust, 
shows Federman’s generosity and concern with his readers. On a general 
level, what is also illuminating and thoroughly life-aﬃ  rming is the fact 
that although 80, Federman is still genuinely interested in what position he 
occupies in the literary historical tradition. Granted, he has moved on from 
questions regarding his status as an experimental, postmodernist writer, 
as hilariously illustrated in this line from Aunt Rachel’s Fur: 
I was sad to see postmodernism disappear before we could explain it, I kind 
of liked postmodernism, I was happy in the postmodern condition, as hap-
py if not happier than the previous condition. I don’t remember what that 
was called but I was glad to get out of it. (245)
Yet the sense that one gets from Federman’s personal missive is that he 
sees the notion of exchanging ideas as the most signifi cant act in the con-
tinual formation of any one writer or reader, be they 40 or 80. As a gesture 
of courtesy – and perhaps paying for disappointing Federman for having 
edited his email to me where he makes statements as to the ‘sexiness’ of 
my writing – I returned the favor and wrote a prose poem in honor of two 
of his most interesting characters, Moinous and Namredef. Me&Us and 
Federman backwards paying tribute to what in writing constitutes the 
highest stage of creativity: appropriating, pla(y)giarizing, and quoting 
“the potentials” and listening to their voices as they designate language in 
absentia – ….. XXXX. 
The patient reader will thus be rewarded with a full blown critifi ctional 
autobiography where the lives and times of Federman and Elias are en-
tangled in the key to astonishment.
Roskilde, May 15, 2008

Noodling Around:
on a frame-breaking [de]tour 
through Federman’s surfi ctions
LISBETH RIESHØJ AMOS
 It’s a great story, I hope you’re not in a hurry, because it’s going  to be a long 
detour, but essential, wait till you hear...
–  Federman, Aunt Rachel’s Fur
The Jewish writer and critic Raymond Federman was born in France in 
1928 and immigrated to the United States of America in 1947. During World 
War II, when Federman was still only a boy, his parents and two sisters 
were deported to Auschwitz and exterminated there. Federman only mi-
raculously escaped death because his mother pushed him into a closet be-
fore his family was taken away. These traumatic memories form the under-
lying story of all Federman’s literature.
With his two highly experimental novels Double or Nothing (1971) and 
Take It or Leave It (1976), Federman presents us with two somewhat thinly 
disguised versions of his autobiography while, at the same time, he ex-
plores the problematic concept of representation. With their pronounced 
emphasis on the actual process of production, playful displacement of 
words on the page, and high level of self-refl exiveness, these novels can be 
classifi ed as ‘historiographic (radical) metafi ction’.
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The purpose of this paper is to investigate some of the narrative strate-
gies employed by Federman. In particular his use of diﬀ erent types of frame-
breaking techniques, including concrete prose, which foreground one of the 
most central issues in Federman’s fi ction: the (im)possibility of fi nding an 
appropriate linguistic representation of autobiographical experiences. This 
essay argues that Federman’s pronounced use of metafi ctional strategies is 
perhaps the most adequate approach for him if he is to at least att empt to 
recover and confront the unspeakable memories of his past.
Intrusive Commentary: 
putt ing the past under erasure
The fi ctional writer who interferes with the story he is telling to such ex-
tent that it never actually gets told is a frame-breaking strategy that is fre-
quently employed in Federman’s novels. Using such strategies inevitably 
foregrounds the process of production, the telling of the story – or in Fe-
derman’s case, the impossibility of telling the story. Double or Nothing and 
Take It or Leave It are both examples of novels that dramatise the struggling 
writer in his desperate att empt at rearticulating a past of unspeakable 
events. In both novels, Federman presents us with numerous key autobio-
graphical elements around which his narrators constantly interweave lay-
er upon layer of digressions and interrogations in their att empt to under-
stand and recover the historical truth. 
What is interesting though is the manner in which Federman’s narra-
tors deliberately play down the whole area of Jewishness and the Holo-
caust. The teller in Double or Nothing, for example, insists that “this is not 
[…] a Jewish story” (Federman, 1971: 40), and similarly the second-hand 
teller of Take It or Leave It claims that “[I don’t want to insist too much on 
the Jewish side of this story but one cannot avoid it altogether I just hope 
you guys don’t make too much out of it]” (Federman, 1976: 2231 ) – the lat-
ter statement is even literally bracketed oﬀ  from the rest of the discourse 
by Federman’s own square brackets. Despite such overt claims, it becomes 
clear that both narrators cannot drop the subject entirely as it is repeatedly, 
1 My pagination, which will  be used henceforth as regards all quotations taken from Take 
It or  Leave It.
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almost compulsively, alluded to throughout their discourses. This is ex-
plicitly manifested in Double or Nothing as the teller struggles with the ar-
ticulation of an appropriate opening for his story (from Federman, 1971: 42).
(48)
The second-hand storyteller in Take It or Leave It uses a similar technique, 
though in an ironic tone,
I’m not going to make you weep / o-o / with all the sad stories he told me 
and yet if I wanted to tell you all the crap he told me (the trains the camps) 
if I wanted to describe in details and realistically all the misery and suﬀ er-
ing he endured (the lampshades the farms the noodles) we would never get 
out of here / o-o / ah yes his entire family remade into lampshades (father 
mother sisters ah yes uncles aunts cousins too) you wouldn’t believe it 
(wiped out)!  (Federman, 1976: 184).
Calling att ention to these traumatic past events only as a means of explic-
itly stating that they will not form part of the discourse, that they “won’t 
come into this story” (Federman, 1971: 135), paradoxically has the oppo-
site eﬀ ect. These deliberate att empts of cancelling out any elements that 
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can be associated with the Holocaust merely foreground their present ab-
sence. Continuously haunting Federman’s narrators, the momentary 
glimpses we do get of the past remain strangely present in the background 
of the novels. They thus become something that requires yet simultane-
ously defi es representation, implying that there is more to these stories 
than meets the eye, so to speak, but that it can never be successfully seized 
or recovered by Federman’s narrators. 
By situating the teller in an extra-diegetic position, Federman not only 
dramatises but also clearly foregrounds the existential aspect of the imagi-
native process of production: the idea of reinterpreting and coming to 
terms with the traumatic experiences of his past through the act of ‘story-
fi cation’. Using the frame-breaking strategy of intrusive commentary, Fe-
derman creates a realm in which a sense of co-existence between two on-
tologies is maintained. This allows for a dialogue between the writer and 
his discourse as the former goes through the painstaking process of ap-
proaching the historical truth by turning it into a story. Never seeking to 
hide the fact that these autobiographical elements are always introduced 
within a fi ctional context, the notion of the teller as the authorial creator of 
his text remains possible for us to believe in. However, this idea cannot be 
maintained throughout Federman’s two novels, which I want to elaborate 
on in the following.
Collapsing Worlds: 
when fact and fi ction become interchangeable
The worlds that Federman creates are by no means simple. They might 
appear simple at fi rst, but as I want to illustrate now, Federman soon de-
prives us of any stable centre of orientation, leaving us with worlds that 
are most suitably described as ‘impossible’. Towards the end of both Dou-
ble or Nothing and Take It or Leave It, the frame-breaking activities become 
so radical that “all the rules and regulations are going down the drain” 
(Federman, 1976: 261). In fact, the only rules that can possibly be applied to 
these contradictory and highly illogical universes are the ‘rules’ of fi ction.
At the very beginning of Double or Nothing, a whole section, paradoxi-
cally entitled “THIS IS NOT THE BEGINNING” (Federman, 1971: 0), has 
been devoted to explaining the four-level narrative hierarchy in which the 
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teller is situated. Ironically, the whole idea of overtly establishing this neat-
ly structured framework is done only in order for it to be playfully broken 
down again. This meta-section can be att ributed to the fourth person who 
(in a footnote) claims that he is “hidden somewhere in the background 
omnipresent omnipotent and omniscient to control direct dictate a behav-
iour to the three other unfortunate beings” (000000000.0). Presumably this 
voice thus represents the implied author of the text, Federman-the-paper-
author, who inhabits the highest level of the narrative hierarchy. Gradually 
descending within this recursive structure, we fi nd a “middle-aged man” 
(0) whose task it is to record the activities of yet another man, namely the 
teller who is to invent the story of the protagonist (with a background con-
spicuously similar to Federman’s). Towards the end of the story, this initial 
framework is radically undermined, starting with the two lowest levels of 
the discourse. As the teller claims how “eventually [the protagonist] too 
would lock himself in a room with noodles to crap out his existence on 
paper” (124), it becomes evident that the two of them are overlapping. 
Federman’s frame-breaking activities do not stop here but are stretched 
even further to include all four diegetic levels (below from p. 173). 
      
Demolishing the foundation on which we rely in order for us to make 
sense of this discourse, Federman leaves us very litt le, if any, solid ground 
against which anything can be verifi ed. 
In a similar fashion, the world of Take It or Leave It also becomes more 
and more self-contradictory as the protagonist, on his way to Camp Drum, 
all of a sudden addresses his creator, the second-hand teller who (presum-
ably) inhabits a superior world, 
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Hey listen! Would you mind if I told this part of the story myself? I mean 
directly. Because you see now we are coming to the climax, I mean the real 
juicy part, and it would be bett er, and also much more suspenseful if I were 
to speak directly – fi rst-hand! 
I don’t mind (I told him, when the time comes). But can you pull it oﬀ ? Can 
you handle it by yourself? I mean, remember, I am the one who is supposed 
to recite this tale second-hand. And besides, it is not legal, you know! What 
will our listeners say when they discover I’ve handed you the narrative 
voice? 
Please let me try! Just for a while. For this one part. It really means a lot to 
me! You’ll see, I’ll do it right! 
Okay! (Federman, 1976: 377) 
As the second-hand teller passes over the authorial voice, he does in eﬀ ect 
recognise himself as a fi ctional construct and we are therefore no longer 
able to maintain the notion that he and the protagonist exist on diﬀ erent 
planes. Leaving the protagonist in charge of the recitation has serious con-
sequences for the framework of the novel as the telling and the told be-
come somewhat indistinguishable. As the protagonist struggles to keep 
his Buick Special on the road, this struggle is mirrored in the narration, 
which is equally diﬃ  cult for the protagonist to keep on the right track – or 
is it the other way round? Federman’s text oﬀ ers us no stable frame of ref-
erence: we are unable to determine whether this is to be read metaphori-
cally or literally. Both readings seemingly apply, though our logic dictates 
that we cannot have it both ways. In the end, both journey and narration 
swerve oﬀ  course and into a ditch.
Undermining the fi ctional framework in his novels, Federman removes 
the solid foundation and textual ‘depth’ that we normally depend on in 
order for us to make sense of a text (hence his own classifi cation of these 
novels as ‘surfi ctions’). Everything within these irrational universes is there-
fore subsumed by language and, consequently, the tension between his-
torical fact and fi ction, memory and imagination, ceases to exist. Thus our 
experiences from the empirical world no longer suﬃ  ce as a means of inter-
preting the universes that Federman creates. The only thing that undoubt-
edly remains ‘real’ is the physical existence of the book we are holding in 
our hands.
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Concrete Prose: 
an att empt at ‘visualising’ the unspeakable past
Indeed, the physical existence of his novels is something Federman fore-
grounds as Double or Nothing and Take It or Leave It are highly innovative in 
their typographical layout. Reading these novels almost equals a visual 
cinematic experience. We are literally forced to manoeuvre the book 
around as we encounter numerous textual segments that are printed di-
agonally across the page, upside-down or sideways, and instances of shaped 
typography that through their shape simulate the shape of real-life objects 
and processes.  In other words, Federman clearly subverts the traditional 
use of typography and, consequently, the extreme physicality of his typo-
graphical designs continually disrupts the projected worlds of his texts. 
Although the use of concrete prose emphasises the ‘bookiness’ of Feder-
man’s novels and therefore serves as an ironic self-representation, I would 
argue that employing such strategy should not merely be seen as a playful 
jest. There is, in fact, an inherent sense of doubleness in these novels; a 
constant vibration between seriousness and playfulness, articulation and 
disruption, and Federman’s use of concrete prose is no exception. This 
technique too becomes a way of insinuating the serious elements of his 
past that lie in wait beneath the ludic surface of his discourses.
Page 7.1 of Double or Nothing is referred to as “Digression on potatoes” 
in the “SUMMARY OF THE DISCOURSE” (Federman, 1971: 192) at the 
very end of the novel (see plate 1). This page appears as the teller considers 
whether potatoes or noodles would be the most appropriate food for his 
one-year seclusion. Having sett led on noodles, this page could of course 
quite literally be seen as a ‘digression on potatoes’. However, this is an 
understatement; a deliberate att empt at disparaging, yet again, the haunt-
ing presence of Federman’s unspeakable past. The page number too with 
its “.1” certainly suggests the intentional att empt of turning something 
highly signifi cant into something insignifi cant. Here we fi nd the sequence 
of the four Xs that carefully inscribes the loss of Federman’s family as a 
visible sign. In placing the sign that marks the erasure of his family above 
a swastika so conspicuously large that our eyes are automatically drawn to 
it, Federman produces a short segment charged with emotion and painful 
loss. 
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Another example in which Federman plays down his Jewish origin can 
be found in Take It or Leave It on page 40 (see plate 2). Here the symbol of 
Jewishness, the Star of David, stands out remarkably from the page, yet its 
signifi cance is deliberately denied and mocked by the discourse that forms 
one of the two triangles constituting the symbol itself, “of course I’m Jew-
ish You guys didn’t know Look at my nose But that doesn’t mean that I’m 
some sort of fanatic about all that crap about religion tradition deportation 
extermination etcetera et” (Federman, 1976: 40). As we have already estab-
lished, the act of retracting the sudden and reoccurring allusions to “the 
Jewish side of this story” (223) has the opposite eﬀ ect. This example points 
to the fact that Federman cannot completely evade his traumatic past as it 
haunts the many diﬀ erent levels of his discourse.
The fi nal example of concrete prose that I want to discuss is also taken 
from Take It or Leave It. This textual segment on page 253 (see plate 3) is best 
described as a ‘conceptual icon’ and is probably the closest Federman gets 
to the historical truth: the unspeakable “SYSTEMATIC EXTERMINA-
TION” of his family.  Again, the four Xes (here literally introduced only 
within square brackets) signify the present absence of his obliterated fam-
ily. The lack of any syntactical continuity and the many gaps between the 
fragmented words convey a deeply moving visual image of Federman’s 
great loss. This is an image that stays with the reader, remaining visible as 
an aft erimage implanted in the reader’s mind long aft er the book has been 
read.
 Using concrete prose as a narrative strategy, Federman not only fore-
grounds the materiality of his books, he also clearly points to the fact that 
words and the traditionally static arrangement of these simply do not suf-
fi ce when att empting to capture the unspeakable historical truth. By liter-
ally shaping the linguistic material in various ways, Federman creates nu-
merous instances of ‘concrete sayings’ that work in a twofold manner: we 
can look at them like pictures and we can read them as prose. However, no 
matt er how we choose to read the many competing discourses that consti-
tute each of his novels, the fact remains that Federman never tries to de-
ceive us: his pronounced use of frame-breaking strategies always points to 
the fi ctionality of the few glimpses we get of his traumatic past.
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Real Fictitious Discourses: 
writing autobiography
I lurch forward […] and dive into my story even if that means repeating 
myself somewhat aft er all let’s be honest a biography or a guy’s past experi-
ences it’s always something one invents aft erwards in fact life is always a 
kind of fi ctional discourse a lot of bullshitt ing! (252)
With these words, the narrator in Take It or Leave It captures the essence of 
what is being practised in Federman’s two novels. The frame-breaking 
strategies, as we have seen, certainly foreground the problematic process 
of transforming elements of the past into stories. By constantly breaking 
the fi ctional framework, Federman leaves us with only allusions to a his-
torical truth that lurks beneath the textual surface, while at the same time, 
he repeatedly reminds us that these novels are linguistic constructs. The 
serious issues that haunt Federman’s discourses can therefore never be 
validated as ‘solid’ historical facts. The overt fi ctionality of Federman’s au-
tobiographical accounts, however, does not mean that he denies the exis-
tence of his past. Rather, he clearly acknowledges the past as discursive, 
thus it can only ever be accessed by means of textuality – always in a medi-
ated form. In Critifi ction: Postmodern Essays, Federman elaborates on this 
idea and claims that, 
[F]iction and autobiography are always interchangeable, just as life and fi c-
tion, fact and fi ction, language and fi ction, that is to say history and story 
are interchangeable. And this because, for me, the STORY always comes 
fi rst. Or to put it slightly diﬀ erently: everything is fi ction because every-
thing always begins with language, everything is language. The great si-
lence within us must be decoded into words in order to be and to mean 
(Federman, 1993: 89).
Double or Nothing and Take It or Leave It are clearly manifestations of this 
paradox: remaining forever unreliable, language is however our only means 
of att empting to approach and make sense of the world around us, past as 
well as present, although it never allows us to represent or seize the ‘real’ 
event. So when one of Federman’s many voices in Double or Nothing claims 
that “you’re gett ing everything confused […] his story and my story” (Fe-
derman, 1971: 65), the obvious pun on “history” signifi es Federman’s own 
view on the constant and reciprocal interplay between fact and fi ction. 
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Hypothetical Reality: 
Federman’s Narrative Strategies
JESPER CHRISTENSEN
The reality of imagination is more real than reality without imagination, and besides 
reality as such has never really interested anyone, it is and has always been a form of 
disenchantment. What makes reality fascinating is the imaginary catastrophe that 
hides behind it. 
–  Federman, Critifi ction 
Nineteen years old, the French Jew Raymond Federman arrived in Ameri-
ca in 1947. Here  the young man eventually became a scholar, critic and an 
accomplished author of experimental literature – what he refers to in his 
own terminology as ‘critifi ction’ and ‘surfi ction’. The subject in his literary 
production is predominantly a self-conscious att empt at writing the life 
story of this young man, and his writings can best be described as ‘histo-
riographic metafi ction’. Briefl y stated, one might describe Federman’s 
work as greatly inspired by the claustrophobic textual concerns of Beckett , 
and closely related to Sterne with its preoccupation with how to go about 
autobiography. 
At the centre of Federman’s writings is the fact that he lost his entire 
family in the Holocaust. This essay will look closer into the specifi c narra-
tive strategy of how Federman includes hypothetical notions in his work. 
The textual examples are taken from Federman’s two novels: Double or 
Nothing (1971) and Take It or Leave It (1976). Moreover, this undertaking 
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will include an investigation of how these texts deal with the issues of 
memory and potentiality within the ephemeral framework of historical 
facts and Fate. 
 Double or Nothing
In 1971 Federman published a novel which full title is: Double or Nothing – a 
real fi ctitious discourse. It is a self-cancelling text that is concerned with de-
scribing the preparations involved in writing the story of a young man 
who arrives in America shortly aft er World War II. Ostensibly it is to be 
Federman’s autobiographical account, however, throughout the text this 
presumption becomes increasingly diﬃ  cult to maintain. An example of 
this is the narrative stance in the text. The text stipulates that no less than 
four separate entities are involved: the ‘fi rst person’ is the recorder, the one 
who scribbles the story down; the ‘second person’ is the teller of the story 
and he is to spend 365 days confi ned in a room creating the story; the ‘third 
person’ is the protagonist, who is given diﬀ erent names several times 
throughout the text and who has to wait for his life to be writt en; fi nally 
there is the ‘fourth person’, who is the author proper – implicitly Federman 
– who renounces all claims to authorial responsibility. Indeed, this is an 
example of how something can be both double and nothing. Thus, confu-
sion and self-contradiction is constant throughout the text. 
Confronting the Past through Hypothetical Reality 
The persistent use of hypothetical notions throughout the text contributes 
greatly to the unsett ling of any grounding in solid fact in the novel. This 
becomes apparent at the fi nal page of the novel where a detail in the bud-
get for the planned 365 days writing process is found to be inaccurate: 
IMAGINE THAT! that means that you now have 52 dollars (416 less 364 
leaves 52) more to work with ….. and therefore we have to start all over 
again It’s quite obvious: JUST THINK…FOR INSTANCE…IF THE ROOM 
COSTS ONLY 7 BUCKS A WEEK.. […] Then it does not necessarily have to 
be  N O O D L E S ! THE END (Federman, 1971: 191) 
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This is an example of how Federman uses hypothesis to completely cancel 
out the text in its entirety. The reader is reminded that nothing in the text 
has been granted the status of being textual reality: all 191 pages are merely 
hypothetical mental notions – suggested textual reality as it were – of what 
could be writt en.
This constitutes a general narrative strategy that reappears in both Fe-
derman novels analysed in this essay: the use of hypothesis as a means of 
confronting the issues of historical fact. The haunting memory of Feder-
man’s exterminated family plays an especially crucial part in this. 
Throughout Double or Nothing there are many allusions to the fate of the 
protagonist’s family, such as:
[…] of course French Jews don’t speak it [Yiddish] any more A dead tongue 
for them A least [sic] not the new generation the left  over generation the 
reduced generation Those who didn’t end up as lampshades (I don’t have to 
go into that but it’s there in the background and will always be there Can’t 
avoid it even if you want to THE CAMPS & THE LAMPSHADES (Feder-
man, 1971: 39)
And later on:
(you can’t avoid the facts) But we must forget about that about the Jews the 
Camps and about the L A M P S H A D E S (never again) (Federman, 1971: 
181)
All these passages where the family is mentioned or alluded to are care-
fully defi ned as something that will not be mentioned in the text. Thus 
mentioned in the form of sous rature, erased yet still present, the protago-
nist’s family are painfully conspicuous in their absence, just as the repeated 
reference to them as x-x-x-x. X is the mathematical sign for the horizontal 
line, that which is unknown. The etymological origin is the Latin abscissa: 
that which disappears. The implication is that within Federman’s self-can-
celling hypothetical discourse the haunting memory of his absent family is 
granted existence. Only within a discourse in which nothing is real but 
merely hypothetical notions can we be told of the absent family. So absurd 
and unfathomable is the absence of an entire family that it takes a dis-
course in which nothing can be certifi ed as being textual reality proper for 
Federman to be able to confront this gruesome twist of fate.
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In fact Federman expresses a strong wish to dissolve the painful past 
that lies before his arrival in America. As seen in the two quotes above, 
Federman att empts to avoid the memories of the haunting past even 
though he realises that it is impossible:
I could use my own name It might get confusing though because people 
will start identifying me with him that’s dangerous must avoid that A Rus-
sian name? Originally his father came from Russia but you can’t go into that 
Nothing beyond the boat [from France in 1947] I mean nothing in the past 
in fact the whole story is a break with the past THE WAR THE CAMPS THE 
FARM ! THE WAR THE CAMPS THE TRAIN [Catt le transportation train, 
presumably going to the Auschwitz concentration camp, from which the 
young Federman escaped] THE FARM Nothing of all that as though he had 
not even been marked Consciously. Or at least he doesn’t know it obviously. 
I do of course necessarily. That should come in fl ashes. Images. (Federman, 
1971: 48–9) 
Through the narrative strategy of hypothesis Federman can create a tex-
tual environment, a zone, where the conventional textual reading proto-
cols do not apply. Moreover, by unsett ling and displacing any concept of 
reality, the reader can perhaps begin to comprehend the unutt erable 
tragedy of Federman’s past. The memory of X-X-X-X is introduced as 
that which will not be mentioned, the use of a predominantly hypothetical 
discourse allows the erased to re-appear while at the same time leaving the 
past undisturbed. 
The reader is brought into a state of reading where the concept of dou-
ble or nothing can be grasped. It is an oscillation between historical reality 
and potential/hypothetical textual reality – a twofold vibration – from 
which glimpses and mental images of Federman’s memory of his lost 
family can be sensed. The unutt erable remains unsaid, yet the notion of 
that which has ceased to be remains.
Take It or Leave It 
Much like Double or Nothing, Federman’s 1976 novel Take It or Leave It is a 
circular, self-cancelling text. The narrative stance is complicated somewhat 
as the narrator informs us that he was told the story by the protagonist 
29HYPOTHETICAL REALITY
under a tree. As such the story has passed through several hands – or, 
more to the point, diﬀ erent memories – before the reader sees the text.
  Again the ostensible autobiography centres on the protagonist Fren-
chy (who has a past very similar to Federman’s) and his experiences as a 
paratrooper in the American army. Frenchy is granted a month’s paid leave 
before he is to be shipped overseas to fi ght in Korea. This time is to be 
spent sightseeing in America. However, due to a bureaucratic error, the 
protagonist has to travel some 3-400 miles up near the Canadian border to 
collect his money. It is on this journey that we travel along with Frenchy, 
and are told of his past. 
When Hypotheses Take Over 
It’s not logical . . . fucks up the whole system! Imagine what will happen . . 
– what the POTENTIALS will say when they hear about this! (Federman, 
1976/1997: 254) 
This extract illustrates well the way in which hypothetical mental notions 
distort the distinction between reality and hypothesis in Take It or Leave It. 
The result is a state of aporia where logic ceases to apply as a relative term 
by which one might gauge what is reality and what is hypothesis within 
the narrative. This suspends the entire text in limbo. Meaning is still con-
veyed onto the reader.  However, to distinguish between Truth and Hy-
pothesis is a matt er of careful deconstruction. But, as we shall see below, 
even this distinction cannot be obtained. For as the use of hypothesis in-
creases in the novel it becomes completely impossible to separate such po-
tential instances from actual occurrences. Thus, it really becomes a matt er 
of ‘taking it or leaving it’.
This view on reality is further elaborated later on in the text, where a 
situation in the protagonist’s past is described. Upon arriving in America, 
Frenchy was taken in by an uncle and his wife and the situation develops 
into a ménage à trois:
He [Frenchy] was so to speak in a between-time-stage a fi nancial meantime 
a virtual present rather than a true or actual present not to mention the 
emotional in-between therefore he was in suspense between two lives and 
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it in this meanwhile this parenthetical gap this temporal spread this existen-
tial displacement (Federman, 1976/1997: 222–3)
Again we see how historical time, existential status and truth are replaced 
within Federman’s discourse. Here hypotheses take over to such an extent 
that no distinctive hegemony of either hypothesis or truth can be estab-
lished. Such a textual ‘zone’ of complete aporia can also be described as a 
hypertrophied-hypothesis.1 When a text enters this level, which lies be-
yond the principle of reality/hypothesis, a complete surrender to aporia 
must be accepted. 
An example of just how complicated or ‘perverted’2 a discourse which 
is a hypertrophied-hypothesis can be is seen in the following example, 
where the protagonist tells the following to a narrative entity who sud-
denly materialises inside the travelling car:
What do you think I would be today if it were not for Hitler? Do you know 
what I would be? A tailor! Yes a litt le Jewish tailor Boulevard des Italiens. Or 
else an instituteur in some retarded school. But let me assure you I would 
not be on my way to Camp Drum [to obtain the money for his leave] discov-
ering America. I would not be here with such a nice guy like you making up 
my life as I go along. No! Certainly not. Therefore funny as it may sound 
Hitler in a way was my Savior! (Federman, 1976/1997: 263)
We here witness how hypothesis is used to illustrate the arbitrary nature 
of Fate. Through applying a playful stance on potential outcomes within 
the past, the protagonist illustrates how the discourse can distort reality. 
The comment on how Hitler saved the protagonist from a dull and un-
eventful life is of course sarcastic, for Hitler was certainly not the saviour 
of the victims of the Holocaust. Through contrasting the actual contempo-
rary situation with several hypothetical notions of what might have been, 
the haunting memory of those who fell behind, the x-x-x-x, is again 
prominent through their absence.
1 For a complete defi nition of this concept as well a close examination of the theory on 
temporal hypotheses, see Christensen, 2004.
2 Another defi nition of Federman’s text as far as the complicated and oscillating sense of 
time in a narrative is to describe it as ‘perverted’, a term which Genett e has used to 
describe Proust’s A la recherché du temps perdu.
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The overall state of aporia within the text, which is largely due to the 
use of hypothesis, is summed in the following meta-comment on the nar-
rative structure of Take It or Leave It:
It is not easy I tell you for someone who lacks experience and imagination 
to handle this type of twin situation — situation which brings together ele-
ments of the past and of the present on the same level (not to mention ele-
ments of the future and of the potential). (Federman, 1976/1997: 296)
Such a ‘twin situation’ is one that Federman has dealt further with in his 
1982 novel, The Twofold Vibration, wherein the oscillation between various 
historical periods of the protagonist’s/Federman’s life, including future 
events, occurs. Again this novel is seen as falling into the category of hy-
pertrophied-hypothesis.
Returning to Take It or Leave It, we have established that the distinction 
between reality and hypothesis is completely insoluble. Towards the end 
of the novel this becomes apparent to the protagonist. He has travelled 
along the snowed up, icy road to reach the military base and his money. 
Suddenly he skids oﬀ  the road, into the precipice. Luckily a giant tree 
breaks his fall:
I waited like that. Hurting all over. For hours. Two. Three Four. I seemed to 
have lost the notion of time. And in fact I had lost it. And also the notion of 
space. I was in total nothingness! In complete LESSNESSness my friend 
Sam would say where nothing is even less than nothing. (Federman, 
1976/1997: 381–2) 
The protagonist thus expresses the textual aporia that lies beyond hyper-
trophied-hypothesis. Just as in the closed space of one of Samuel Beckett ’s 
texts. Frenchy/Federman seems to acknowledge that a textual realm can be 
created in which all dimensions of reality can be dissolved. As the protago-
nist Frenchy tells us:
For in fact, all experience is both active and passive, the unity of the given 
and even the construed, and the construction one places on what is given 
can for that matt er be either positive or negative. It is what one desires, or 
fears, or is prepared to accept, or it is not!  (Federman, 1976/1997: 210)
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For Federman as an author the realm of aporia that can be reached through 
a continuous use of hypothesis is the perfect sett ing for dealing with his 
autobiographical memories. When a discourse cannot be defi nitively vali-
dated in terms of historical reality or simply as the Truth, then the personal 
pain that stems from the haunting memory of the past becomes bearable. 
(Un-)remembering the Past
[…] there was no need to choose: the memory could have been left  so far 
behind that one day its “reality” wouldn’t matt er any more. Of course it 
happened. Of course it didn’t happen. (Pynchon, Gravity’s Rainbow: 667) 
Reading Federman’s texts is to witness a constant challenge of the conven-
tional relationships between the concepts of both historical facts as well as 
fi ctional facts. As Federman cautions at the onset of Take It or Leave It:
All the characters and places in this book are real, they are made of words, 
therefore any resemblance with anything writt en (published or unpub-
lished) is purely coincidental. (Federman, 1976/1997: Epigraph)  
Raymond Federman is a survivor att empting to come to terms with his 
fate. In his literary production he succeeds in telling the story of himself 
and his absent family by not telling it. By displacing all discursive ground-
ing in reality through the constant use of mental hypothetical notions, Fe-
derman circumnavigates the pitfalls of sentimental representation. The 
mimetic representation of the past via a textual discourse is an illusion that 
is successfully dismantled in the novels Double or Nothing and Take It or 
Leave It.  
In these texts, Federman reminds us that narrative, its space and time, 
are but constructs. Whether the narrative of his family, the x-x-x-x, can be 
ascertained as either real or hypothetical has ceased to be of importance. 
By conveying the most painful parts of his narrative through the use of 
hypothesis, that is, forwarding potential mental notions of history through 
a discursive sous rature, the reader att ains a unique empathy for Feder-
man’s haunting loss. For by not telling and explaining the reasons for this 
reluctance, Federman has successfully surrendered his memories to us. 
The paradox is that we fully believe in Federman’s memories by accepting 
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that we do not know which, if any, part of his historical discourse is truth-
ful. Just as history, so memory is a discourse which we choose to believe in; 
much depends on the framework of its representation.
In his comments to Steven Spielberg’s movie, Schindler’s List, Federman 
expresses his diﬃ  culties with watching the historical re-enactment of the 
Auschwitz concentration camp:
Me, usually, when watching a movie, I wonder how they do it? How they 
fool me, how they make me believe that the litt le boy who just got shot by 
Goeth is really dead and not faking it. Aft er all I heard the sound of the bul-
let leave the gun and heard it enter the litt le boy’s skull. I saw the crushed 
skull, and the blood, even though shown in black & white. I heard that, I 
saw that. Or was it an illusion? (Federman, 2004)
The point is that the past cannot be recreated. A sensory illusion can never 
fully create a credible illusion, although it may ever so eﬀ ective.  As we 
have seen, Federman’s approach to the representation of the past is much 
more subtle; yet, his elusive discourse of the past succeeds in conveying a 
mental sense of his haunting loss.
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Second Thoughts:
Federman’s Cultural and Individual Memory in 
The Twofold Vibration
BENT SØRENSEN
You have to get on with things, sustain your excessiveness.
–  Federman, The Twofold Vibration 
French born writer and critic Raymond Federman is best known as a prac-
titioner and theorist of experimental fi ction and as the inventor of terms 
such as ‘surfi ction’ and ‘critifi ction’, both denoting a type of literature 
where literary theory and practice meet in an acutely self aware form of 
mythographic metafi ction. Aft er coming to the US at the age of 19 in 1947, 
Federman studied creative writing at Columbia University, wrote a cele-
brated PhD thesis on Samuel Beckett , and worked for many years as a 
professor of literature at SUNY, Buﬀ alo. This essay is concerned with the 
playful representation of memory and history and its consequences in his 
1982 novel, The Twofold Vibration. The novel poses questions about the inter-
sections between political activism, history, popular culture and memory.
Plot and Narration in The Twofold Vibration
The novel sets up a narrative hierarchy which evolves organically as the 
narrative progresses. At fi rst it seems quite clear that the main narrator, 
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who uses the fi rst person singular to refer to himself, and who is referred 
to by his (imaginary) interlocutors (or readers) as “Federman”, has control 
over this hierarchy. However the situation soon becomes more complicat-
ed as it turns out that the main protagonist of the novel, known only as 
“the old man” or “the old guy” shares most or all of the biographical fea-
tures of “Federman”, the narrator. This confl ation of personal history is 
presented as one of the crucial operations of the novel and of the writing of 
personal as well as general history:
[This] means that the old man was born in 1918, like my father, coinciden-
tally, or for that matt er like me, fi ctitiously speaking, what’s the diﬀ erence, 
we are all extensions of one another, the living as well as the dead, we all 
overlap within the twofold vibration of history (Federman, 1982/2000: 11)
One should not be fooled by the phrase, “fi ctitiously speaking,” since it is 
paradigmatic within Federman’s understanding of writing that it is always 
“real fi ctitious” as witnessed by the use of this phrase as the subtitle of his 
‘novel’ Double or Nothing (Federman, 1971/1991).
The next operation of confl ation of narrators and their status in the sys-
tem has the potential for moving two ways in the diegetic hierarchy: either 
one diegetic level up, namely to the ‘real’ author, Raymond Federman, 
whose biography one can then examine for similarities with “Federman”, 
the narrator; or one diegetic level down, namely to the protagonist level 
within the novel. 
We shall look fi rst at the protagonist level, where we next encounter 
“our friends Moinous and Namredef” (Federman, 1982/2000: 23). This pair 
of characters later grow in importance in the novel, as they are entrusted 
with more and more powers, eventually becoming substitute narrators, 
dutifully reporting back to Federman on their endeavours to trace and res-
cue the old man. Of course, the notion that “we are all extensions of one 
another” is also applicable to the diegetic status of these two characters, a 
fact further underscored by their names, which variously reveal them to be 
“Federman” spelled backwards and a compound of two personal pro-
nouns in French, ‘moi’ and ‘nous’ – or, MeWe. They are thus literally exten-
sions of the fi rst person narrator, who conveniently has split his persona 
into these four agents, allowing him to let any and all of the personae com-
ment on the others, and on the progress of the narrative as such.
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Metafi ctional Jewishness
This radically metafi ctional technique is not covertly employed by Ray-
mond Federman, but on the contrary pointed out explicitly to the reader. 
In this quote the notion of Jewishness is also brought into focus:
oh you people didn’t know Namredef and Moinous are Jewish too, well I 
haven’t mentioned it because I thought it was obvious, and anyway this is 
not their story, they are incidental here, they have been introduced simply 
for the convenience of the narrative, to help along, to allow some shift s o 
point of view and some creative free play. (153–154)
The theme of Jewishness has been introduced at a very early stage of the 
narrative, but its importance has been played down by “Federman”, the 
narrator: “[T]he old man […] had to struggle all his life to conquer vanity 
and indolence and [was] of Jewish origin on top of that, not that this fact 
makes much diﬀ erence here, not at all, it’s quite irrelevant to this story, or 
barely relevant” (18–19). This statement is belied by the events to unfold 
later in the narrative where it turns out that the old man’s ethnicity and 
family’s destiny is of highly marked signifi cance. This is already evident a 
few pages later, where we casually learn about his parents’ and sisters’ 
fate: “His parents were so poor, […] and did they suﬀ er, their entire lives, 
from hunger and humiliation, before they were exterminated, and his two 
sisters too, xxxx out, is how he always put it” (22). The 4 Xes discretely 
represent the erasure of the four humans constituting the family unit, not 
only of “the old man”, but also of Federman, the author. Thus it is in this 
nexus of personal memory and history that the confl ation of diegetic levels 
becomes especially evident. The denial of the importance of the Jewish 
ethnicity is x’ed out by the reality of the Holocaust experienced re-doubled 
on both the authorial (“real”) and character (“fi ctitious”) levels. Simultane-
ously, the diegetic levels from author, through ‘paper author’, narrator and 
protagonist/character are thoroughly imbricated, and the diﬀ erence be-
tween them x’ed out or put sous rature.
The re-doubling of character and author’s Jewish destiny is quadrupled 
by Namredef and Moinous’s Jewishness, which we have already quoted 
the revelation of. Immediately preceding that passage the two characters 
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confess their ethnicity, but deny that it colours their contemporary life – 
unlike that of “the old man”:
Is it because you’re Jewish, asked Namredef totally out of breath, I’m Jewish 
too and I don’t get excited like you when I am in the midst of Germans, you 
can’t blame them all, is it because your entire family was exterminated by 
the Nazis, so what, mine too was remade into lampshades at Auschwitz, or 
have you forgott en
And mine too, mine too, intervened Moinous who was holding on to his 
side as he trott ed along splashing in the rain. (153)
“The old man” replies with his own denial of the importance of ethnicity, 
but interestingly uses a Jewish term of derogation (“schnorrers”) to char-
acterise the two characters:
The old man shrugged his shoulders, It has nothing to do with that, and 
besides I’m not worked up, I’m just being philosophical, that’s all, the two of 
you always confuse ideology with sentiment, yes it’s amazing how you two 
schnorrers always have to reduce everything to your Jewish sentimentality. 
(153)
Later the reader, as well as all the individual personae, is addressed with a 
similar term from Yiddish discourse, again denoting mild but playful der-
ogation:
It’s all there, you schmucks, inside the words, teller and told, survivors and 
victims unifi ed into a single design, if you read the text carefully then you’ll 
see appear before you on the shatt ered white space the people drawn by the 
black words, fl att ened and disseminated on the surface of the paper inside 
the black inkblood, that was the challenge, never to speak the reality of the 
event but to render it concrete into the blackness of the words. (225)
At this point the reader must give up believing in the narrative hierarchies, 
since too much diegetic and thematic confl ation has occurred. Each narrat-
ing and narrated persona has been revealed as unreliable and double-
voiced or double-voicing. The theme of erasure has been countered by the 
paradox that erasure (in to “white space”) takes place through the marking 
(with X’s: “simple design”, “black words”) of a page, much like the 
smudging of the pages by the author in the act of writing the novel we 
are reading. 
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History and Future Nazism
In her position paper for the subproject on Cities and memory on the 
ACUME website, Monica Spiridon writes:
There are many ways of building identities: the starting points, the dimen-
sions, the purposes of the projection and especially the audiences which 
they address are always diﬀ erent. Yet, all these processes have something in 
common. Individuals as well as communities have to imagine their identity 
in relation to some landmarks, selected by the individual and the public 
perception. These landmarks organize identities along some important 
lines: to be more specifi c, they help understand, justify and evaluate – either 
positively or negatively – their self-perception and the perception of the 
Other. (Spiridon, 2002)
The tension posited here between individual and collective memory is op-
erative in Federman’s work. In all memory work he advocates for the place 
of invention as an empowering tool for both the aesthetic practice of the 
novelist and the ethical project of the historian.
The truth of whether personal history and memory determines the fu-
ture life and acts of the personae, or whether all these acts are lived out in 
the shadow of cultural memory and destiny is thus an issue that presses 
itself in the foreground more and more as The Twofold Vibration progresses. 
The risk of history playing itself out in a circle game as suggested by the 
phrase “it’s starting all over again” (9) in the novel’s fi rst sentence is strong-
ly underlined by the theme of “the space colonies” which “the old man” is 
waiting to be deported to at the novel’s outset. These “space colonies” are 
a thinly veiled caricature of the death camps of the Nazi’s, and the superfi -
cially benevolent rhetoric of the government justifying the colonies closely 
echoes Nazi propaganda: 
[U]ndesirables are sent, you know criminals and perverts, madmen or those 
who are considered physically or mentally abnormal, social derelicts, the 
useless ones, the good-for-nothings and others too, isn’t it a tremendous 
idea, old folks and sick people are also sent there, the incurables, that solves 
the problem of the aged, social security and medicare, and it also wipes out 
crime and unemployment, not to mention sexual perversion
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artists too are sent there, yes especially experimental artists whose work is 
found totally unredeemable according to the new idealistic social and aes-
thetic norms now in vogue. (13)
And best of all: “[T]hey make more space for the rest of humanity” (13) i.e. 
Lebensraum. This satire of utopianism as well as belief in eﬃ  ciency and ra-
tionality as tools for controlling history shows Federman’s programme to 
be mainly an aesthetic one, but one that never loses sight of the political 
implications of a given aesthetic stance. This becomes clearer when we re-
turn to Federman’s non-fi ction on the poetics of postmodern metafi ction, 
as well as his personal essays on how and why to be a Jewish writer. What 
is evident here is that the future is fraught with much the same perils as the 
past, as history was. We are doomed to repeat our failures if we do not al-
low space for human invention in both senses of the term.
History, Activism, and Memory
But now we turn to the segments of his novel, The Twofold Vibration, which 
explicitly thematize the issues of history and memory. From the outset we 
(the readers and the whole coterie of co-narrators being addressed direct-
ly) have been told by “Federman”, the narrator, that the whole story is a 
repetition of a previously occurred and told sequence of events: “Hey you 
guys wake up, it’s starting all over again, but this time it’s going to be seri-
ous, the real story, no more evasions, procrastinations, and you won’t be-
lieve this, it begins in the future” (9), which further more is told from: “a 
potential point of view, premembering the future rather than remember-
ing the past” (10). Much as history at large repeats itself with the concen-
tration camps re-doubled in the fi gure of the space colonies, Federman’s 
personal history redoubles itself in the old man: as Federman, the author, 
escaped deportation to Auschwitz, “the old man” is left  behind when the 
rocket leaves for the space colonies: an excess that nobody even wants to 
bother with deporting.
Next we zoom in on one of the prememberings referred to above, 
namely the sequence which begins with “the old man’s” involvement in 
the anti-Vietnam War movement in the USA. “The old man” accidentally 
becomes embroiled in a campus demonstration in Buﬀ alo, New York, in 
the late 1960s. He performs what amounts to an acte gratuite by hurling a 
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bicycle at a policeman, and from there he becomes propelled by events 
beyond his control into a role as a political activist/celebrity. The pace picks 
up when a thinly veiled Jane Fonda-like character, June Fanon, chooses to 
champion the cause of the “Buﬀ alo 45”, of whom “the old man” is cast as 
a leader by the media. As casually as “the old man” hurled the bicycle, the 
two ‘activists’ fall for each other’s charms and decide to “forget about the 
revolution” and elope together to Europe. This apparently irresponsible 
act is further motivated by “the old man’s” assertion that “most of us live 
our politics in the past” (to which Fanon replies: “Or in the future”) (79), 
and, what is more, that “political understanding is but a series of second 
thoughts” (68). 
Both characters escape the historical moment of the 1960s without 
qualms: Fonda/Fanon already planning the emotional depths of future 
fi lm roles that have yet to be created for her (for instance, her Oscar win-
ning performance in 1978 in Coming Home); “the old man” dreaming of 
repeating a fabulous winning streak at the roulett e tables of Monte Carlo. 
In the greater scheme of the novel, both these pursuits are presented as far 
more substantial than 1960s counter cultural activism. The couple there-
fore go on a trip which gradually evolves into a journey of remembrance 
for “the old man”, which takes him from casino tables to the Nazi death 
camps that are symbolically fi gured as a birthplace for the character’s sec-
ond, surplus life in America.
Thus the novel’s preoccupation with history, remembering and pre-
membering, leads us to present a twofold thesis: “The old man’s” acciden-
tal political radicalism leads to remembrance of and obsession with the 
past, which ultimately is redeemed in an eﬀ ective working through of 
trauma; whereas Fonda/Fanon’s carefully designed, but futile activism 
leads nowhere but back to Hollywood, simply because it does not result in 
any exoneration of a past burden or guilt, but merely serves as a future 
oriented publicity strategy.
Thus, it is in the cross-fi eld between history or cultural, shared memory 
and individual, personal story that the way forward may be forged, para-
doxically of course by moving backward into personal memory. So, de-
spite the eventual declaration that “History is bankrupt” (234), the debts 
that history cannot meet can be cancelled by an individual project of re-
plenishing the coﬀ ers of memory. Therefore the project of writing Jewish 
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history remains an impossibility, yet a necessity for the individual Jewish 
writer. The scale on which this is possible for Federman is captured in the 
anguish of the following quote: “I am oft en asked”, Federman writes, “as 
a survivor of the Holocaust and as a writer: ‘Federman tell us the story of 
your survival’. And I can only answer: ‘There is no story. My life is the 
story. Or rather, the story is my life’” (Federman, 2001).
Federman’s ability to write of history can only be realised via remem-
brance as narrative strategy: one writes in order to prevent collective for-
getfulness, and remembrance reveals that which is sous rature, erased but 
still legible. “It is necessary to speak”, he says, “to write, and keep on 
speaking and writing (lest we forget) about the Jewish Holocaust during 
the Nazi period even if words cannot express this monstrous event. It is 
impossible to speak or write about the Holocaust because words cannot 
express this monstrous event” (Federman, 2001). We cannot go on telling 
it, but we must go on.
Personal and Cultural Memory
The fi nal twist in the tale of Federman, the author’s, dramatisation of his 
personal fate comes in another quote from the same article, entitled, tell-
ingly “The Impossibility of Being a Jewish Writer”:
Take my case for instance. What do you think I would be today if it were not 
for Hitler? Do you know what I would be today? I mean if nothing had hap-
pened. No war, no occupation, no collaboration, no deportation, no exter-
mination – no Holocaust. Yes, do you know what I would be today? A tailor. 
A litt le Jewish tailor slaving in a tailor shop on Boulevard des Italiens in 
Paris. Or else an instituteur in some intellectually retarded school in the 
province of France. But let me assure you [and here the protagonist and the 
author merge into one], I would not be a writer (an experimental writer, I 
am told), dealing with such an important topic as the Holocaust. No, I 
would not be here, making up my life as I go along. Certainly not. There-
fore, funny as it may seem, disturbing and grotesque as it may sound, Hitler 
in a way was my savior. Yes, I know it’s laughable, preposterous, but it’s 
true. (Federman, 2001)
The paradoxes involved in being created by your greatest destroyer or in 
the tension between liberation and loss, are echoed in the words of the old 
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man in The Twofold Vibration, speaking to Fanon, but in fact narrating his 
past experiences to us all:
[T]he fact of being a survivor, of living with one’s death behind, in a way 
makes you free, free and irresponsible toward your own end, of course you 
feel a litt le guilty while you’re surviving because there is this thing about 
your past, your dead past and all that, but you have to get on with things, 
sustain your excessiveness (Federman, 1981/2000: 99–100).
Memory sets you free from the yoke of history. History never lets go of the 
bridles of one’s individual memory.
In Critifi ction, Federman’s collection of essays on postmodern literature, 
he elevates this principle to a general poetics, complete with a cultural 
criticism that frames the dismissal of Fanon’s future strategy, which leads 
only to the space colonies, or back to the concentration camps:
Until very recently one read novels – especially those writt en in the fi rst 
person – as though they were mere autobiographies, and it was assumed 
that the writer merely wrote what he remembered of his life, of his youth, 
of his family, of his amorous adventures. Consequently, memory (volun-
tarily or involuntarily) was considered the sole mechanism that made per-
sonal or autobiographical fi ction possible […] Contemporary experimental 
fi ction is no longer writt en as remembered events, but on the basis of in-
vented events which seem to be happening (very much as in the cinema 
right before the reader’s eyes, in the present (author’s emphasis through-
out). (Federman, 1993: 100–101)
This quote of course describes Federman’s own fi ctional (or fi ctitious) 
practice in novels just such as The Twofold Vibration. The twofold-ness of 
such works lies exactly in the fact that the dynamics between memory and 
invention is kept in eternal motion, never resting long on one pole. 
We thus know very litt le new about Federman’s real life aft er reading 
what could be supposed to be an autobiographical account, but we know 
infi nitely more about the function of memory as a strategy for dealing with 
trauma, loss and guilt aft er reading what could equally easily be supposed 
to be a wholly invented, fi ctionalised holocaust story.
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Sesame Undone:
Negotiations of [Virtual] Space in 
Federman’s blog [the laugh that laughs at the 
laugh…]
CAMELIA ELIAS
Yes, I know that some people, especially the anti-logo-cen-tristes, will tell you it’s the 
contrary, that actions are true and words false, but they’re full of shit, I know what 
I’m talking about, and don’t ask how I know, or where I got it, probably from 
Namredef, me I always steal things from him ...
–  Federman, Aunt Rachel’s Fur 
If asked about his long career as a writer of fi ction, poetry, criticism, cor-
respondence, journal entries, photographs and documents, and “recycled 
texts” Raymond Federman would probably say that the most important in 
his writing has been what it says about life. Ever since the early 70s when 
he gained recognition for his innovative works that combined fi ction, criti-
cism, and autobiography, the questions of authority and authorship, origi-
nality, meaning, appropriation, and above all, collaboration, have been on 
his writing agenda. Going from concerns with the textual and the literari-
ness of a text in such works as Surfi ction (1975) and Critifi ction (1993), in 
which the question ‘what is this text about’ was clearly formulated so that 
it addressed itself in a metafi ctional gesture – the text is always about 
aboutness, rather than about something else – Federman’s recent writing 
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exhibits a concern with the cultural in the text as it is mediated by per-
sonal experience through that of others. Although here I should mention 
that the textual aspect in any of Federman’s texts has never been separated 
from the cultural as such, insofar as all his writings deal with the experi-
ence of the subject who, because of fi nding himself in a perennial state of 
transit, is a cultural and textual theorist par excellence. 
Coming to the US in the 40s as a survivor of the Holocaust, becoming 
a writer and a professor of literature Federman has experienced what it 
means to write from the position of the marginal and thus engage in strat-
egies of embodying sites of agency through resistance. As scholars in auto-
biographical studies remark, here Julia Watson and Sidonie Smith follow-
ing multicultural theorists such as Arjun Appadurai, “individuals as sites 
of agency deploy their imaginations as a social fact and a kind of work to 
navigate the disjunctures of global fl ows that create radically diﬀ erent self-
understandings” (Smith & Watson, 2001: 44).
In terms of strategies towards self-understanding, most of Federman’s 
writing – whether fi ction or criticism – makes recourse to the fi gure of the 
double. Novels having titles such as Double or Nothing, Take it or Leave it, 
The Twofold Vibration – which furthermore all have a very engaging and 
engaged fi rst person narrator – suggest that there is always a double per-
spective at work that not only activates imagination in a more dynamic 
and pluralistic visual way but also opens a space precisely for the articula-
tion of a radically diﬀ erent self-understanding. Here, I’m interested in 
tracing this process of self-cognition through the act of self-writing in a 
forum that engages several agents in a more direct way than we fi nd it in 
a book format; namely, writing on the internet. 
With the advent of the internet the reader gains a more immediate 
agency. Unlike in the tradition of printed matt er, within which, if margina-
lia and scribbling is possible it is so only as a solitary act that elicits no 
immediate feed-back – a reader’s doodling in a book is not immediately 
accessible to the book’s author, if at all – blogging on the internet opens up 
for the possibility of having a dialogue between the author of the blog and 
the potential readers of it. Thus more than one participant, including the 
author, can be engaged on several levels and on texts that run on screen 
either in their synchronic or diachronic lay-out. 
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Here it is interesting to note how a writer such as Federman, who has a 
history, as it were, of developing the fi gure of the double in all his printed 
books – which are also typographically challenging in this sense – man-
ages to stretch the intrinsically playful, and also self-consciously ludic 
double so that it becomes a multitude of selves in the virtual space of the 
internet. This multitude of selves, while embodying the site of agency that 
is enabled by resistance to traditional modes of narration, aims at showing 
the fi ctionality of reality through virtuality. Communities are imagined, lit-
erature’s ontological status is uncertain, imagination displaces reality, and 
the life of the author is shown to be contaminated by the lives of all those 
who care to respond to writing with their own (ad hoc) formulations.
The idea that the self, and hence subjectivity, is always conditioned by 
relations is, however, not a new invention where Federman is concerned. 
As early as his works on Beckett  in the 60s Federman has advanced the no-
tion that all writing is self-writing, and because of that entirely fi ctional. 
This paradox – inherent in the notion that the self is never ‘self’ but an-
other, to paraphrase a master cultural theorist, Arthur Rimbaud, who fa-
mously declared that “I is another” – challenges autobiography as a genre 
by prompting us in the direction of considering autobiography more as an 
act (Elizabeth Bruss), a relation (John Eakin), an att itude (George May), or 
a fi gure of reading (Paul de Man).
I argue that Federman’s blog, which oﬀ ers us new writings in juxtaposi-
tion with older writerly manifestations, gives us the possibility to partake 
in his transformations as a writer and as a person. What conditions the 
dynamic process between the author and his readers is the idea that all 
readers must also become writers if the author is to experience a sense of 
an emerging plural self. Quite literally, the invitation to leave a comment 
in the blogosphere is a constitutive act of self-representation enabled by 
the making of a direct gesture of reducing subjectivity to the bare essen-
tials. “I” is not only another – as it becomes the other at the moment writ-
ing takes place – but is already other. In cyberspace this already other is 
autobiographical to the extent that we can trace its anthropological virtual-
ity through a network of links and relations. In his book, How our Lives be-
come Stories (1999), John Eakin makes the following comment in support of 
his claim that if we have a sense of self to express in an autobiographical 
work, we do so because of our relations to others; (and the implicit pre-
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sumption here must be that these relations are all established beyond the 
text, which makes autobiography already a virtual thing). 
Given the face-oﬀ  between experiential accounts of the “I,” on the one hand, 
and deconstructive analyses of the “I” as illusion on the other, my own in-
stinct is to approach autobiography in the spirit of a cultural anthropolo-
gist, asking what such texts can teach us about the ways in which individuals in a 
particular culture experience their sense of being “I” – and in some instructive 
cases that prove the rule, their sense of not being an “I.” (4)
What sets Federman apart, as a writer and as a cultural voice, from other 
writers and cultural theorists is the fact he has made the realization that in 
the virtual space a community of potential readers and writers is not mere-
ly imagined but performed. Furthermore, this community is not only per-
formed, but is itself performative. There is a move from traditional modes 
of narrating a life to experiencing it through the stories of others. In this 
sense, and in terms of agency – who says what to whom from what posi-
tion – Federman aligns himself more with theorists and philosophers of 
the event (Badiou), performative studies (Butler), and queer studies (Hal-
berstam) for whom agency is not only a site of resistance but also a site for 
the possibility of variation. For example, for Judith Butler, subjectivity is a 
matt er of performance that follows the rules of the game: you are what 
your culture says you are; if you decide to play another role, most oft en 
than not you lose, or you pay more than it’s worth. For Teresa de Laurentis, 
the unconscious is a site of agency: you are what your desire dictates that 
you are; this must mean that if desire is suppressed, your agency is limited 
to following others; if desire is let loose, your agency is channeled through 
desire’s excesses. Both these cases call for regulations of the fl ow of nego-
tiations which has its own set of implications for the way in which we get 
to think about disjunctures.
In autobiographical studies this can be translated thus: in the words of 
Porter Abbot: 
[A]utobiographical narrative begins and ends in the presence of its making. 
To read fi ctively is to ask of the text: how is this complete? To read factually 
is to ask of the text: how is this true? To read autobiographically is to ask of 
the text: how does this reveal the author? (Abbot, 1988: 613)
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Against this background Federman has three clearly articulated messages. 
1) Have some fun! Nobody is perfect; 2) Instruct! But acknowledge the 
limit of your knowledge; 3) Subvert politics! Mess up the authorial voice: 
‘who speaks what to whom, on what and whose authority’ must be re-
garded within the frame of the personal which is seen both as a risk and as 
an opportunity. Thus the mode of expression in the blog is set up. And the 
fact that the line from Beckett ’s Watt  – [the laugh that laughs at the laugh], 
which plays on the question ‘what’ (is this all about) – is framed by square 
brackets is not incidental either. What is this text about is an impossible 
question that can only be addressed through role-playing. Role-playing is 
a form of scriptedness that invites us to consider the function of simultane-
ity and plurality in the juxtaposition of texts and voices, writers and read-
ers. What is at stake is the question of the extent to which each party is 
willing to open up a space for the others to occupy, and by occupying, to 
read.
Writing Selves on Paper
In order to bett er understand what is at stake in Federman’s blog, I oﬀ er 
here a brief excursion into one of Federman’s most exciting books, The Two-
fold Vibration (1982), in which the emergence of the writer’s self is mediated 
through negotiations of variations on the fi rst person narrative. The short 
discussion of The Twofold Vibration will serve to illustrate how the tension 
between (distant) history as formulated on paper, and (immediate) history 
as formulated through anticipating media interventions diminishes. In 
this work par excellence Federman explores the extent to which one can re-
count one’s personal past and history through the deployment of pseudo-
selves whose function is to undo history through engaging in a discourse 
that can be termed immemorable. This is to say that past events are not re-
membered in any representational way, but are preformed beyond memo-
ry and beyond the memorial.
In a gesture that aims at performativity Federman thus declares in The 
Twofold Vibration that “History is bankrupt” (1982: 234). This suggests that 
history, like money, is a liability in the hands of investors who can lose it, 
gain it again, invest in it, sell it, buy it, conceal it, reveal it, make it avail-
able. All these fl uctuating and confl icting aspects of history are in fact re-
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current in all of his fi ctional works and point to a world of potentiality. As 
a subject in a historical context, one relates to history’s potential by exhibit-
ing what Federman calls a “sense of historical possibilities” (254).
On a general level, Federman’s works are saturated with making his-
tory, and particularly personal history, an active part of memory which 
never sett les with ‘solid’, or ‘simple’, facts, but rather develops possibilities 
and potentialities around factual certainties. “I am oft en asked”, Federman 
writes, “as a survivor of the Holocaust and as a writer: ‘Federman tell us 
the story of your survival’. And I can only answer: ‘There is no story. My 
life is the story. Or rather, the story is my life’” (Federman, 2001). 
All Federman’s fi ctional work is concerned with construing variations 
on statements such as these, which mark a demand for distinguishing his-
tory from story, reality from fi ction, and space from time. Federman’s ca-
pacity to think historically is enforced in the idea of remembrance as a 
narrative strategy: one writes in order to remember, and one remembers in 
order to be able to reveal. “It is necessary to speak”, he furthermore says, 
[T]o write, and keep on speaking and writing (lest we forget) about the Jew-
ish Holocaust during the Nazi period even if words cannot express this 
monstrous event. It is impossible to speak or write about the Holocaust be-
cause words cannot express this monstrous event. (2001) 
For Federman therefore, history is a dialectical bind which involves the 
transmission of that which is both necessary and impossible. His notion of 
history is not defi ned by a rejection of it as an ideology but by creating a 
mode of discourse in which history is open to possibilities. This openness 
is also what mediates between the real and the fi ctional grounding of the 
telling of a story in life and life in the telling of a story. The example that 
best illustrates what it means to approach history “from a potential point 
of view”, as Federman puts it in The Twofold Vibration, is a passage from his 
essay “The Necessity and Impossibility of Being a Jewish Writer”. Here 
Federman actually quotes himself from his novel Take It or Leave It (1976), 
which suggests that the negotiation for a space in which the character can 
develop vacillates between making choices for a genre and sett ling for it: 
fi ction, autobiography, or hybrids across, such as autofi ction, or autobiofi c-
tion may be. The protagonist, a French Jew survivor of the Holocaust 
says:
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Take my case for instance. What do you think I would be today if it were not 
for Hitler? Do you know what I would be today? I mean if nothing had hap-
pened. No war, no occupation, no collaboration, no deportation, no exter-
mination – no Holocaust. Yes, do you know what I would be today? A tailor. 
A litt le Jewish tailor slaving in a tailor shop on Boulevard des Italiens in 
Paris. Or else an instituteur in some intellectually retarded school in the 
province of France. But let me assure you [and here the protagonist and the 
author merge into one], I would not be a writer (an experimental writer, I 
am told), dealing with such an important topic as the Holocaust. No, I 
would not be here, making up my life as I go along. Certainly not. There-
fore, funny as it may seem, disturbing and grotesque as it may sound, Hitler 
in a way was my savior. Yes, I know it’s laughable, preposterous, but it’s 
true. (2001)
What this passage suggests is that fi ction validates an element of potential 
truth, or reality in history. And what Federman is trying to say is that his-
tory would not be history if it were not open to both possibility and poten-
tial. Possibility and potential create excessiveness in relation to the theme 
of survival. Survival is rendered possible insofar as it is based or condi-
tioned on a memory or unconcealment of what has the potential to pass 
into oblivion. But while survival itself cannot be expressed by memory, it 
is nevertheless a manifestation of memory. As he further elaborates in The 
Twofold Vibration:
[T]he fact of being a survivor, of living with one’s death behind, in a way 
makes you free, free and irresponsible toward your own end, of course you 
feel a litt le guilty while you’re surviving because there is this thing about 
your past, your dead past and all that, but you have to get on with things, 
sustain your excessiveness. (Federman, 1982: 99–100) 
Survival as excessiveness, for Federman, is the same as writing disengaged 
from history, and yet a manifestation of historical events unfolding in a 
narrative which engages several voices at the fi rst person level.
But here, Federman’s relation to history goes beyond a mere re-creative 
project of contemporary innovative fi ction, a project which, as Marcel 
Cornis-Pope notes, has been at the heart of postmodern writing in its chal-
lenge of the great “metarecits” – Cornis-Pope, however, being interested in 
whether it is true or even necessary for postmodern fi ction to move be-
yond history (Cornis-Pop, 1994: 1). Narratives such as Federman’s engage 
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with aﬃ  rmations of and beliefs in the “end of history”, as Vatt imo and 
Lyotard posited, from a diﬀ erent perspective where an end is put to that 
story by going not beyond but behind history, backing it up from a posi-
tion of potentiality and possibility. This position assumes virtual propor-
tions in Federman’s later works, but I will elaborate on this a litt le further 
on. 
What remains general, however, is that story telling, for Federman, is 
developed as a “tradition of the immemorial”, to use Giorgio Agamben’s 
term, as it follows a line of questioning what validates writing under the 
sign of history. Federman’s questions are based on the assumption that his-
tory itself is not history but language and tradition without which a “sense 
of historical possibilities” would not be possible. Here I would like to in-
troduce a variation on Federman’s constant att empt to either explain or 
bridge the gap between necessity and impossibility, by proposing that his 
narratives are driven forward by an element of the immemorial, namely 
that which occupies a space simultaneously in the active telling of the 
events which are posited as un-narratable, and in the static representation 
of the events as potential points of view. In other words, Federman’s narra-
tives carry within them a concrete manifestation of memory which they 
want to transmit, and they carry as well the vehicle for transmission, that 
is, transmissibility itself which is conceived ontologically as unthematized 
in any memorial form. For example, what interests Federman in his fi ction 
is not to make central the extermination of the Jews but “the erasure of that 
extermination” (Federman, 2001). He needs, however, to transmit the 
memory of that event in order to be able to erase its ontological manifesta-
tion in the form of extermination. Steal back the voices of those who have 
lost the potential to narrate their own stories in the face of their own hav-
ing been deleted from history. 
Federman’s concept of history as a mediation between a story and its 
audience fi nds resonance in Agamben’s statement at the beginning of his 
essay “Tradition of the Immemorial”: 
Every refl ection on tradition must begin with the assertion that before trans-
mitt ing anything else, human beings must fi rst of all transmit language to 
themselves”, and further: “What has already been transmitt ed in every tra-
dition, the architraditum and the primum of every tradition, is the thing of 
thinking. (Agamben, 1999: 104) 
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Thus we come to the core of the matt er: if language and tradition give us a 
sense of historical possibilities, then the thinking – the already transmitt ed 
thinking, must also be thinking about transmissibility, about what remains 
unthematized in the mediation between a story and us, ourselves in con-
text and our potential, “I”, “me”, and “we”, or in other words, the fi rst 
person. I would like to argue that story telling, for Raymond Federman, is 
an act of provocation which engages the reader in a refashioning of history 
by constructing a narrative which transforms memory, time, and place into 
potentials for a topos where the act of narrating in the fi rst person plural 
becomes the memory of history.
No longer believing in the power of fi ction which makes recourse to the 
autobiographical genre that relies on the use of memory for the narrated 
events, Federman claims that personal memory is superseded by imagina-
tion, insofar as a writer is capable of transforming elements of his life as a 
history into a story. Here Federman contrasts the views on modernist auto-
biographical writing with postmodern fi ction. As he writes:
Until very recently one read novels – especially those writt en in the fi rst 
person – as though they were mere autobiographies, and it was assumed 
that the writer merely wrote what he remembered of his life, of his youth, 
of his family, of his amorous adventures. Consequently, memory (volun-
tarily or involuntarily) was considered the sole mechanism that made per-
sonal or autobiographical fi ction possible […] Contemporary experimental 
fi ction is no longer writt en as remembered events, but on the basis of in-
vented events which seem to be happening (very much as in the cinema 
right before the reader’s eyes, in the present. (Federman, 1993: 100–102) 
(author’s emphasis)
Federman’s distinction between remembered and invented events is medi-
ated by the trajectory that imagination takes in the act of transmitt ing. In 
this context, history is thus the memory of the immemorial, as it were, or 
the memory of the present past. Giving himself as an example of the avant-
garde writer who construes a narrative in the future in order to say some-
thing about the past, Federman deals with a present which always pres-
ents itself in a hypothetical form. One of the points that he makes in his 
narratives of survival is that if he had died in the concentration camps he 
would still have been able to write and tell about his death. His present 
situation as a survivor enables him to imagine himself dead, alive, or some-
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where in between, which is to say both. The memory of that kind of surviv-
ing, then, is transformed into a present from which concrete elements that 
shape history are absent, or await actualization. 
Federman’s strategy of narration by going behind history is an investi-
gation into the immemorial, implicit in the transmissibility of the history 
of the Holocaust, which is posited always as an unfi nished story through-
out all his work. As he recounts in almost all of his narratives, whether 
fi ctional or otherwise, the Nazis had an unfi nished business with him. As 
a child of twelve in 1942, when the Nazis were out on a mission of round-
ing up and collecting Jews in Paris, Federman was pushed by his mother 
into a closet where he remained for two days. Following his escape, he was 
nevertheless caught at the train station and put on a train to the concentra-
tion camps. He escaped from that train, but as he tells in The Twofold Vibra-
tion via an embedded fi rst person narrator, he escaped not because he ever 
intended to escape, but because of an instinct such as hunger which made 
him seize the opportunity to jump on a parallel train while his own train 
was making a stop. Potentiality’s own twofold vibration in Federman’s in-
tent, on the one hand to escape, and on the other, to follow the fate of his 
father, mother, and two sisters who all died, remains for Federman a ques-
tion of hypothetical history caught between unfi nished and unthematized 
time. The fate of his family, which he would have shared or ought to have 
shared, fi nds vibration in the excessiveness of survival.
Implicit in Federman’s dilemma then is the thematization of an act which 
never took place – let’s say the act of dying – but which constitutes how-
ever Federman’s life. Insofar as his life is based on a perpetual potential of 
dying in the past, Federman’s discourse thus remains in a state similar to a 
transmission devoid of transmissibility. And this is the crux of Federman’s 
narrative voice: how to express the necessity and impossibility of individ-
ual experience when it is based on collective memory and discourse which 
is not one’s own. Agamben says: 
Implicit in every act of transmission, it [transmissibility] must remain unfi n-
ished, and at the same time, unthematized. The tradition of transmissibility 
is therefore immemorially contained in every specifi c tradition, and this im-
memorial legacy, this transmission of unconcealment, constitutes human 
language as such. (Agamben, 1999: 105)
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Federman’s works must be seen as an exchange between memory, or un-
concealment, and oblivion or concealment, past and present, story and his-
tory all mediated by the immemorial legacy inherent in transmissibility. 
Memory which combats erasure functions as a vehicle for the representa-
tion of what is under erasure, the “X”. For Federman, the four Xes, which 
he always writes in lieu of the representation of the exterminated family, 
represent a metonymic code which cracks the metaphor of concealment. 
When we are told that the Xes, that is, the family, have been turned into 
lampshades we begin to understand Federman’s “sense of historical pos-
sibilities” insofar as lampshades indeed have the potential to be the vehicle 
for illumination. The tradition of this kind of illumination is however 
bound to remain unfi nished and unthematized, and hence immemorial. 
Federman’s Xes have the potential to shed light on writing which keeps 
history in mind.
For Federman, writing which makes recourse to personal history span-
ning a series of dramatic events (world War II, the Holocaust, exile, immi-
gration to America) is a means of connecting what Monika Fludernik calls 
“the subversive potential” (in Cornis-Pop) of the second person narrator to 
what I would call the “immemorial potential” of the fi rst person plural 
narrator. The interplay between fi rst, second, and third person narrators, 
culminating in the collective narrator/narratee of the fi rst person plural 
further indicates that the reader’s referential fi eld itself becomes a poten-
tial for situating history not in context but in memory. 
The way Federman deals with the demand for writing which relies on 
impossible words is by creating a world of narrators who are all schmucks 
in all 300 or so Jewish senses of the word. These narrators create a situation 
of ‘shmuckiness’ for the writer, usually a narrator and a protagonist at the 
same time. This shmuckiness of the situation is always shown by the narra-
tor to interfere with the transmission of the narrative by the protagonist.
The Twofold Vibration, a narrative about an old man awaiting to be de-
ported to the colonies, not on earth but in space, begins with a consider-
ation of its own point of view, namely “a potential point of view, premem-
bering the future rather than remembering the past” (Federman, 1982: 10). 
For Federman, the potential point of view is initially represented by a third 
person singular pronoun. This pronoun, while always embodying the po-
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tential to become the fi rst person singular, ultimately develops into the 
fi rst person plural as this example illustrates: 
[T]he old man was born in 1918, like my father, coincidentally, or for that 
matt er like me, fi ctitiously speaking, what’s the diﬀ erence, we are all exten-
sions of one another, the living as well as the dead, we all overlap within the 
twofold vibration of history (11). 
Later in the book it is disclosed that “he”, “I”, and “we” are second-hand 
tellers, addressers and addressees of the second person singular and plu-
ral, “you”.
The old man’s story is recounted to a narrator named “Federman” by 
his two friends Moinous and Namredef, who tell the story of the old man 
in the fi rst person plural, interchanging with a narrative voice of both the 
old man as well as that of “Federman” in the fi rst person singular. A fi ft h 
voice is added to the Babylon – that of the author who both participates 
directly in the events at all levels, and makes meta-comments on all levels. 
Moinous, a composite French name based on the pronouns moi (me) and 
nous (we, us), and Namredef, Federman spelled backwards, are two indi-
rect protagonists. When they learn that the old man, who is nameless, is 
about to be shipped to the space colonies, they att empt to stop the deporta-
tion for which no reasons are given. Their investigation into the unknown 
reasons takes place mainly in bars and restaurants of fi rst class food and 
comfort where they occasionally meet “Federman” the narrator, who has 
commissioned a full report from them.
The narrative structure is divided between active protagonists (the old 
man and Federman) and passive protagonists (Moinous and Namredef). 
The old man and Federman are “extradiegetic” “homodiegetic” narrators 
(Genett e, 1972: 256). Their narrative, which they narrate themselves, is, 
however, mediated by Moinous and Namredef, who are “intradiegetic”, 
“hetero/homodiegetic” narrators. Moinuous and Namredef act as fi ctional 
narrators insofar as they are the creation of Federman the narrator who 
placed them in the story for the purpose of creating dynamism and a sense 
of chronology.
There is a struggle for the primacy over voice, and a desire for inverting 
the active and passive roles. Moinous and Namredef oft en complain about 
their “plotless existence and its lack of dramatic development” (Federman, 
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1982: 232), and in spite of their taking pride in their att ributes as characters, 
they remain unsatisfi ed with their fi ctional status. For instance, Moinous is 
very keen on details and always gives elaborate descriptions of objects and 
colours, however irrelevant, while Namredef sees himself as a character of 
insight. He oft en interrupts Moinous by oﬀ ering short comments on the 
narrated event. But while they are both good at reporting, they are very 
bad at interpreting and cannot decipher symbols. As they recount the old 
man’s travelling through Europe, where he is either visiting concentration 
camps or casinos, Moinous and Namredef do not realize that they them-
selves make up the link between such incongruent events. Whenever there 
is a jump from one extreme to another, the time between events is Moinous’s 
and Namredef’s time, and then they become active participants in the nar-
rative. When they all go to see Wagner’s Parsifal immediately following the 
old man’s visiting the concentration camp in Dachau, they engage in a dis-
course of disapproval, taking on the burden of the suﬀ ering Jew. Objecting 
to their complaint, the old man’s voice merges with that of the author who 
oft en criticizes the approach to art taken by many Jewish writers who feel 
the need to respond to what they think is demanded of them, namely to 
assume responsibility for the entire history and suﬀ ering of the Jewish 
people. “Everything in art is contradictory”, the old man says in a tone of 
exasperation following the Wagner performance. Irritated by the crowd 
sharing his enthusiasm, he urges Moinous and Namredef to get out of the 
streets. Contradiction establishes the relation between extra/intra/hypodi-
egetic narrative levels and 5 voices intercalate as the following passage il-
lustrates:
Let’s get the fuck out of here, the old man suddenly said as he rushed us into 
the street
I don’t understand why you get so worked up, Namredef told his old friend, 
I really don’t get it, aft er all you are the one who wanted to come here, who 
drove forty-eight hours like a maniac to get us here, the old man was walk-
ing in long strides, almost running, Namredef and Moinous trott ing along 
to keep up with him, they are both short and a bit fl abby, Is it because you’re 
Jewish, asked Namredef totally out of breath, I’m Jewish too and I don’t get 
excited like you when I am in the midst of Germans, you can’t blame them 
all, is it because your entire family was exterminated by the Nazis, so what, 
mine too was remade into lampshades at Auschwitz, or have you forgott en
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And mine too, mine too, intervened Moinous who was holding on to his 
side as he trott ed along splashing in the rain
The old man shrugged his shoulders, It has nothing to do with that, and 
besides I’m not worked up, I’m just being philosophical, that’s all, the two of 
you always confuse ideology with sentiment, yes it’s amazing how you two 
schnorrers always have to reduce everything to your Jewish sentimentality
oh you people didn’t know Namredef and Moinous are Jewish too, well I 
haven’t mentioned it because I thought it was obvious, and anyway this is 
not their story, they are incidental here, they have been introduced simply 
for the convenience of the narrative, to help along, to allow some shift s of 
point of view and some creative free play. (153-154)
There is an ideological point in the use of the fi rst person plural which 
Federman’s narrators illustrate in their fi rst person singular narrative 
which always relates to a second person, “you”, a narrative voice which 
becomes personifi ed as “us”. If “the second person is par excellence the sign 
of a relation” as Brian MacHale puts it, the fi rst person plural can be said 
to designate an immemorial potential. The schmuck, or here schnorrer, is 
a fi gure of immemorial narration insofar as its character establishes itself 
as an authoritative non-voice charged with strong motivations for the ar-
ticulation of history. The schmuck in the fi rst person plural is not confron-
tational but negotiating. What he negotiates are acts of transmission, acts 
of remembrance, story and history, acts which rely on words, both possible 
and impossible. These acts are all employed as vehicles for the demand of 
necessity. The fi rst person plural is implied as a key moment in reference 
to the immemorial, which indicates that the immemorial is a concrete po-
tential of a historical possibility. As Federman asserts:
It’s all there, you schmucks, inside the words, teller and told, survivors and 
victims unifi ed into a single design, if you read the text carefully then you’ll 
see appear before you on the shatt ered white space the people drawn by the 
black words, fl att ened and disseminated on the surface of the paper inside 
the black inkblood, that was the challenge, never to speak the reality of the 
event but to render it concrete into the blackness of the words. (225)
Federman’s fi rst person plural drawn against the background of the “you”, 
of the “you schmucks”, forced into participating in the narrative is a means 
of disclosing the ‘plot’ against traditional modes of narration. The reader’s 
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expectation has been set up and one realizes that one has been framed as 
one of the schmucks referred to. The unspeakable event which Federman 
calls upon is indeed rendered concrete in the words, but what if nobody 
reads? Having a sense of historical possibility means being able to run the 
risk of being a schmuck, championing a position between impossibility 
and necessity. Thus, expanding the reader’s referential fi eld to including 
the potential for situating history not in context but in memory is writing’s 
vehicle for transmissibility. The concreteness of words is not merely a 
manifestation of reading but a manifestation of reading carefully. For the 
schmuck does not speak any reality; he merely transmits it.
  Reading Selves on Screen
If we return to Federman’s blogosphere, we can make the assumption that 
the fi gure of the schmuck par excellence opens up the notion that especially 
in virtual space, nothing is protected from reading. Thus the demand to 
distinguish between Federman’s own voice and the voice of his readers 
who write a comment, or to distinguish the ‘telling’ function from the 
‘showing’ function of the uploaded texts is here exceeded by the very vir-
tuality of the virtual space which creates the writer in its own image: that 
of unreality. Yet again Federman brings himself in that impossible and ab-
stract situation – which he borrows from Beckett : “I can’t go on, I’ll go on” 
– and which refers to his survival. If writing is possible at all, as he so many 
times repeatedly reminds us in all of his works, it is so because it is impos-
sible. One writes thus not with a sense of fi nality, or because one can’t help 
oneself, but with a sense of openness, because one wants to learn from oth-
ers. One writes because one survives through others. At least this is one of 
the messages that the blog forges forth. The vehicle for this message is 
language as a game: what one does in the blogosphere is permute and 
transmute questions such as ‘who’s who?’ ‘what’s what?’ and ‘where’s 
where?’ across various, diﬀ erent, and radically diﬀ erent cultural manifes-
tations. Seen in this light, these questions become the key to the ‘Open 
Sesame’ of subjectivity. 
While Federman is adamant in urging us to keep writing and speaking 
(in his printed works but now even more so in cyberspace), the very trans-
mission of the words, which are impossible to write and utt er, remains a 
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fundamental problem without obvious solutions. If we were to employ the 
well-known metaphor for the kind of search that links writing with an 
imperative or a demand, ‘Open Sesame’, we would realize that this cry as-
sumes a diﬀ erent manifestation in Federman, insofar as he believes that 
writing is an impossible task. Stealing is more like it, and just as Ali Baba 
managed to retrieve some of the fortune that the 40 Arabian thieves had 
hidden in their magical cave that would only open by shouting the code, 
Federman makes a similar gesture: steal from the many and undo the myth 
of continuity. In Hindu legends the sesame seed represents a symbol of 
immortality. If visualized graphically in the context of the story from the 
Arabian Nights collection, an opening of immortality would necessarily 
involve the creation of a major gap. If we keep this image in mind, we can 
say that continuity is only possible if it gets to be discontinued fi rst. In Fe-
derman’s oeuvre the demand to ‘open writing’ and then ‘close writing’ con-
stitutes a gesture towards bridging the gap between necessity and impos-
sibility. Only, this gesture is mediated by a moment in which words are 
stolen. Thus the Sesame is undone.
Federman’s turning to the world of virtual texts has the potential to 
answer the question regarding the consequences and implications of no-
body reading anything anymore, especially books. In an interview with 
Larry McCaﬀ rey in 1980, he talks about the notion of “opening up a space” 
in which to write fi ction. As I have suggested so far, for Federman, the 
dynamics of the act of opening up contributes to the creation of a fi ction 
that is also entirely preoccupied with projections of the self in the future. 
The fi ctional self which emerges as a future potential is bound to re-in-
scribe tradition and the sense of collective fate (everybody died in Aus-
chwitz) within a framework of virtual experience (in cyberspace nobody is 
really alive). In [the laugh that laughs at the laugh] it is clear that one way 
of also dealing with the perception that the Jew is part of a single unifi ed 
group is by emphasizing the ultimate collectivity and connectivity that the 
Internet as a space accommodating more than 40 thieves confers to the in-
dividual. The point in Federman is that the minute we leave a message (as 
a comment on one of his posts) is also the minute we become part of his 
own Jewishness, as we write ourselves over to that specifi c experience too. 
The function of the reader then is thus to ‘graph’ the author’s ‘auto’ percep-
tion in this pseudo-biographical gesture. 
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If we keep the ‘stealing’ metaphor in mind, we realize that cyberspace 
is the space par excellence for exchanging identities, pseudo or otherwise, 
through stealing. As mentioned already, in Federman’s blog, we fi nd an 
array of texts posted for this medium alone, but we also fi nd older texts 
which he recycles, re-appropriates and reprises, either for commercial pur-
poses, or for the sake of simply emphasizing the fact that if writing and 
living are connected, as he otherwise insists they are in all of his works, 
then this connection is necessarily given through and mediated by frag-
ments.
What we can observe from the outset is that the texts writt en for the 
blog, in some way or another, not only refl ect but also complement older 
texts. One of the posts, for instance, on “Statues of Kings”, can be said to 
complement the post based on a quotation from “About Writers and Writ-
ing” (1996):
STATUES OF KINGS
Statues of kings can be categorized as follows:
1. Kings seated on:
a) a throne
b) a stool
c) a boulder
d) a horse (oft en)
e) a donkey (rarely)
f) a quadruped (an elephant or a camel in exotic places)
g) the shoulders of another man (occasionally)
h) the roof of a building (extremely rare occasions)
2. Kings standing on:
a) the ground
b) a podium
c) a stage (oﬃ  cial occasions)
d) a stool with a back
e) a stool without a back
f) a pedestal (oft en)
g) a horse or any other animal (awkwardly)
h) a man lying on the ground (unusual circumstances)
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3. Kings seated or standing with:
a) their arms falling to their sides
b) the left  or right hand on the chest
c) both hands on the chest
d) one hand in the pocket of their trousers
e) both hands in the pockets of their trousers
f) one hand on top of their head (almost never)
g) their legs crossed (very oft en)
h) their eyes closed (only when they are dead)
4. Kings lying down:
a) usually during insurrections or revolutions
b) normally while making love
c) when they are dead
 
ABOUT WRITERS & WRITING
 
1.      The overbearing arrogance of writers is true, just ask us.
2.      If one sits on one’s ass all day, in due course one will enlarge one’s
         asshole.  This is why writers are classifi ed as Big Assholes.
3.      When the writer announces that he or she has found his or her voice,
 you may interpret that to mean:
         a)  
         b)  
         c)  
         d)  
         None of the above  .
4.      Writing is a lot like fucking, but only like it, not it.
5.      I never met a writer I liked, says the writer into the mirror.
6.      Writing is not [we insist] the living repetition of life.
         Moreover, all writing is done [in our opinion] hapharzardly.
7.      Writing is such a burden, especially because of its manual aspect.
 Copyright © 1996 Raymond Federman 
In cyberspace, when one says: “Open Sesame” the treasures found inside 
will consist of a privilege: to have the last word, which has the potential to 
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undo fi nal authority, fi nal authorship, and fi nal authorization. Federman 
understands this, and so do I. We thus bond in the cuts and (w)holes of our 
Jewishness. The last word, now, belongs to me, yet it is graphed as a stolen 
mark; the mark of the “I” as myself, but also as the mark of the “eye” 
which sees me as another. I’m stealing Rimbaud’s line and pass it on to 
Federman: “Je est un autre”. This is what I wrote to Federman not so long 
ago, in connection with another discourse on his writing and delivered as 
a talk at a university in Romania.
Ray, your post reminds me of one of my favorite writers of aphorisms, 
whom you undoubtedly know: Stainslaw Jerzy Lec. He said once: “even on 
the throne, the pants wear out”. The image of kings in whatever position, 
lying down, sitt ing, or running around merely displaying their garments 
with occasional holes in them, makes me laugh. It occurs to me that this 
post complements very nicely your other post, in which you quote yourself, 
“About Writers and Writing”. Perhaps you are suggesting that the question 
for writers still remains similar to that which Alice in Wonderland poses: 
who is to be master? Who is to be king of writing? Any thoughts? I’m writ-
ing as we speak (or write) a paper for an invited presentation at Babes-
Bolyai University in Cluj, dealing, of course, with you as a master. Words 
are sexy, you said to me not long ago, so now I want to ask, even if it’s 
slightly unrelated: have you ever been caught with your ‘writerly’ pants 
down? And if so, what was it like to be seen (or read) in the nakedness of the 
image? (I’m curious about the signs of circumcision; cuts and holes can be 
interesting to read). As ever, Camelia Elias
And as the story goes, not only has Federman replied to my query in a 
private mail that fi lls 10 pages (an edited version of this constitutes the 
epilogue to this volume), but he also posted a conversation with one of the 
Romanian students present at my talk (see “A Conversation with Miloi”). 
And then some of my own students wanted to post something in connec-
tion with a class I’ve just fi nished teaching on autobiography. 
The moral of this story? If Beckett ’s line confuses us: “I can’t go on, I’ll 
go on,” we can turn to reading. Thus reading must go on. Though stop 
reading this. Read some blogs instead.
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Epilog[ical] Encounters
CAMELIA ELIAS  &  RAYMOND FEDERMAN
If it ever becomes necessary for you to eat a book, out of despair or out of some primal 
need, then eat the telephone book, for it is the only book in your library which came free. 
Except, of course, the books you stole.
–  Federman, Eating Books 
Bent Vibrations
In the year 1989 I came to Denmark as a refugee from Romania. Talking to 
the immigration police at the impressive Kastrup airport in Copenhagen, I 
could tell that the women who gave me the preliminary search – as custom 
is when one declares oneself a fugitive – were baﬄ  ed at my parcel. All I 
had with me were a couple of books and a couple of haute couture dresses. 
Odd combination, they thought. Odd combination for a refugee, they fur-
thermore thought. One of the books was a volume that comprised two 
works in one. These works were Raymond Federman’s The Twofold Vibra-
tion (trans. in Romanian as Indoita Vibratie) and Smiles in Washington Square 
(Zîmbete în Washington Square).
I didn’t think much at the time about the Romanian translation of The 
Twofold Vibration, as ‘Bent Vibrations’. I took it at its face value, and consid-
ered it a straightforward title. My English was rudimentary at the time. 
Since then I’ve learned to appreciate the many facets and layers that such 
a word as ‘twofold’ has. Now, I particularly prefer the connotation ‘twice 
68 CAMELIA ELIAS & RAYMOND FEDERMAN
as great.’ In my scholarly papers on Federman, since my fi rst naïve en-
counter with his works, ‘twice as great’ has been the operative phrase on 
all the levels: descriptive, analytical, and evaluative. If Federman has 
proved anything in his long writing career then one could say that he has 
proved to be twice as good as any other writer. At this point I could ven-
ture into another full-fl edged paper on Federman, and explain some more: 
twofold, threefold, and manifold. But the present volume should suﬃ  ce. 
In itself it is already twofold as it dares to entangle a meta-discursive lan-
guage with a more personal take on Federman. Nothing else would cut it. 
Already in Karlstad, when we presented work on Federman, we have 
discovered that the writing on Federman is a special aﬀ air. The four of us 
were very enthusiastic, albeit disappointed to realize that there were very 
few people who knew about Federman. Hence we took it upon ourselves 
to preach to the unenlightened. As it goes with prophets, however, such 
projects can only go two ways in terms of people’s responses: the convert-
ed may say, yes; the skeptics may be dismissive: “there go the nerds.”
As this volume has been writt en against two background demands: 
‘keep on preaching!’ and ‘celebrate Federman at 80!’ one more point should 
be stressed before we render here an actual encounter with Federman, not 
beyond texts, but certainly beyond textuality. We have suggested that what 
makes Federman such a good writer is the fact that he has an acute sense 
of style. This style, however, does not stem from a mere consideration of 
highly aesthetic philosophies, but from careful consideration of readers. In 
Federman’s scheme, all readers are ideal readers. Within this context, I see 
it befi t, in my capacity as an editor, to end on a note that oﬀ ers the readers 
of this volume an insight into what a great master can do: teach how to 
read. Within Federman’s contexts of reading, then, his stories become our 
histories, his status our cult, and his memory our selves.
As with Federman, then, we take reading and writing about reading to 
levels where language is infl ected, bent, turned on and against itself, bitt en 
and eaten by its tail. 
This reading tale is what allows us ultimately to both ask and answer 
the question:  “Am I an autobiographical writer? Yes and No.”
We let Federman vibrate. 
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Dear Camelia1
I read your essay and – yes – it’s a superbe new approach to my writ-
ing – especially your reading of TTV – not just what is says about the 
sordid past – but about how it is said with those multiple voices –
while reading I was scribbling in the margins of your essay –
here are some thoughts –
on the fi rst page I lift ed [notice I didn’t say steal but I should have] 
this sentence  –
“one writes in order to remember, and one remembers in order to be 
able to reveal” [502]
and I wrote it in the big book that seats on my desk with the title :
Federman’s aphorisms / Les aphorismes de Federman –
maybe some day aft er I have changed tense somebody will fi nd this 
book and write a doctoral dissertation claiming that Federman was 
a prophet or a philosopher or simply a madman – there is madness 
in that book – and a lot of thievery – 
anyway –
I always laugh when I reread that passage from TIOLI where Fren-
chy claims that Hitler was his savior –
but rereading that passage in the context of your essai it becomes a 
kind of manifesto for  Federman’s writing – projecting himself back-
ward in order to bett er project himself forward – from the litt le Jew-
ish tailor [most of Federman’s uncles were tailors] he could have 
been to the preposterous experimental writer and madman he be-
came –
you are right to insist on the potential truth – 
1 This is a slightly edited version of an email sent to me by Federman on December 1, 2007, 
in response to a draft  for an invited presentation at Babes-Bolyai University in Cluj on 
Dec. 3, 2007. Permission to reprint Federman’s private text has been given to me by 
Federman himself with these words: “you have my permission to use and abuse whatever 
you need and want from my work including my body.” This is what I call a generous 
author, in extremis. Thank you Raymond for the words and for the body.
2 References in square brackets refer to the pagination in this volume. As Federman refers 
to my text of 2007 in draft  form, it has not always been possible to refer to the exact 
passage. Some formulations have since been changed but the ideas remain.
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I don’t think I invented it – but I think I make good use of it – 
I have oft en said that my death is behind me and that’s why I feel so 
free to do whatever I do write sleep eat smoke pot make love mas-
turbate write read sleep play golf travel and son on –
I am reacting here to that quotation on page 3 from TTV [51] which 
makes you state that survival as excessiveness is the same as writing 
disengaged from history ....
It is true that I do everything excessively and oft en irresponsibly – 
but never with guilt
digression – the French version of My Body in Nine Parts [have you 
read that book] – Mon Corps en Neuf Parties has been staged in France 
by two diﬀ erent theater companies, and is having lots of success, at 
least according to the two articles I just got – this will interest you – 
especially in terms of how my work is fi nding new places new 
spaced to corrupt their minds and bodies – I’ll att ach the two articles 
–
I like what you say on page 4 and elsewhere – about bridging the 
gap [51] – which in my fi ction is oft en referred to as the precipice – 
digression –  have I ever sent you the play I wrote called The Precipice 
– it might interest you –
I hope Camelia I am not boring you with all these digressions and 
refl ections –
your essai really excited me intellectually –
digressive question – why you are so smart and write so well – so 
well in English too –
Page 5. [52] I made all kinds of litt le xxxxx in the margin next to this 
paragraph – litt le xxxx is the way I express agreement and admira-
tion when I read something that moves me or makes me think –
I quote the whole sentence which caused me shake my head in 
agreement and admiration; 
“I would like to argue that story telling for Federman is an act of 
provocation which engages the reader in a refashioning of history 
by constructing a narrative which transforms memory, time, and 
place into potentials for a topos where the act of narrating in the fi rst 
person plural becomes the memory of history.” [52]
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Absolutely brilliant Camelia. This sentence summarizing everything 
I write and how I write it. To put it in a more intellectual fashion – 
you have articulated here my theory of narrative – and I didn’t even 
know I was doing it this way –
Page 6. [52] This sentence –
“One of the points that he makes in his narratives of survival is that 
if he had died in the concentration camps he would still have been 
able to write and tell about his death.” [53]
Yes I would have premembered it from – as my old master once put 
it – from the reverse of farness –
this is why I oft en say – my death is behind me – it’s true – I can even 
remember it –
which sometimes leads me to make this preposterous statement – I 
am immortal until proven otherwise –
I scribbled all over page 7. [ 53-55]
Lots of litt le xxxxxxx aft er this sentence – 
“The fate of his family, which he would have shared or ought to 
have shared, fi nds vibrations in the excessiveness of survival” [54] 
–
ah yes excessiveness –
in the novel I just fi nished – in French – which I hope you will soon 
read – it’s called Chut: Histoire d’une Enfance – yes I have fi nally man-
aged to write about the 13 years that preceded the closet – in a way 
I have just writt en the end of the big book I’ve been writing for more 
than 40 years – my end is in my beginning – as Eliot put it – me my 
beginning is in my end –
in that novel I describe a scene in which litt le Raymond is playing 
doctor with his litt le sister Jacqueline –
a voice comes into the text to ask if I was imposing on my sister 
when I was examining her scientifi cally – here is my answer to that 
question –
Federman, rien n’est normal avec toi.  Peut-être que ta soeur n’aimait pas 
ce que tu lui faisais. Peut-être qu’elle pansied que tu t’impasse.
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Je sais pas ce que ma petite soeur pansied ou ressentait. Mais elle riait. 
Peut-être qu’elle ressentait ce que W. B. Yeats a si bien exprimé dans son 
beau poème Leda and the Swan. The Shudder  in the loins.  
Mes soeurs n’ont jamais connu le frisson au bas du ventre. Cela leur a été 
refusé. Peut-être est-ce la raison pour laquelle j’ai tant abusé de ce frisson, 
pour compenser le plaisir et la douceur Que mes soeurs n’ont jamais con-
nus.
Tu aurais pu raconter autre chose.  Une autre histoire de ce Que tu faisais 
avec tes soeurs.
Raconter quoi ? Les sordides moments Que nous avons passé ensemble 
dans notre petit taudis de Montrouge ? Cela réduirait l’histoire de mes 
soeurs à un naturalisme pathétique. Mes soeurs méritent mieux Que ça.  
Mieux qu’une histoire de misère.
Tiens, je vais mett re ici le poème Que j’ai écrit pour ma soeur Jacqueline.
NOTRE SOEUR
         À sa mémoire
mon frère me dit-elle
dans le noir de très loin
écris le poème 
que je vais te murmurer
mais il a peur que les mots
ne sortent pas comme il faut
mon frère me dit-elle
de son petit tas de cendres
quand tu traversas l’océan
et que tu as eu le mal de mer
est-ce que tu as été malade
pour moi aussi
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mon frère me dit-elle
parmi les feuilles mortes
quand tu es tombé amoureux
pour la première fois
et que tu as ressenti en toi
le grand frisson originel
et que tout s’est mis à tourbillonner
est-ce que tu t’es senti heureux
pour moi aussi
still on page 7 [54], I pondered this:
“Implicit in Federman’s dilemma then is the thematization of an act 
which never took place – let’s say the act of dying .........dying in the 
past” –
page 8 has become a huge collage [55] –
you know that this expression – time immemorial is used by Beckett  
a number of times – especially in The Lost Ones –  
then this
“...lampshades indeed have the potential to be the vehicle for illumi-
nation” [55] –
yes to illuminate – but also the potential of shading the light –
I think it’s in To Whom It May Concern that I wrote –
he fears the light that shines through human skin –
I love what you did with the word schmuck –
and I love that fi rst person plural –
in Double or Nothing of course 
and especially in TTV – federman moinous namredef all speak in 
the fi rst person through the mouth of Federman [with a capital let-
ter]
this is where your reading of TTV touches me the most – no one has 
really paid att ention to the narrative intricacy of this novel – in fact 
litt le att ention as been given to this novel – it was ignored and is still 
ignored – sometimes I feel it may be my best novel – but then Double 
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or Nothing and Take It or Leave It start screaming at me that they are 
my best – of course the characters in these novels have not read Re-
turn to Manure and Chut – 
digression # ? – the other day a young French journalist – quite at-
tractive – concluded an interview we were doing in Paris with this 
question – Monsieur Federman quel est votre roman préféré – and I an-
swered – in English – the one I haven’t writt en yet –
in any case – I oft en go and read pages of TTV and I am surprised at 
the things I said in that book –  
for instance that the old man was the same age as my father and as 
myself [and I could have added Sam Beckett  too] for indeed the Old 
Man is all of us – he represents the living-dead and vice versa the 
dead-living –
page 9 [55] also looks like a collage – 
I’ll just repeat what I wrote in the margin –
TTV – a danse macabre of pronouns 
Wow! I wrote when I discovered that Moinous & Namredef are ex-
tradiegetic homodiegetic narrators but at the same time they are 
also intradiegetic hetero/homodiegetic – Wow? [56]
What a revelation – and nobody knows that – yes they both as The 
Unnamable put it of himself – the teller and the told –
you give on page 9 [56–57] the best synopsis of TTV ever given – and 
so succinctly – you are the fi rst one to notice that Nam and Moimoi 
are kinds of detectives who have been commissioned to give a re-
port – not unlike Moran in search of Molloy –
it’s amazing how present Beckett  is in this novel – from the epigraph 
to the end of the novel where the epigraph is now inscribed into the 
report –
It’s true that their investigation takes place mainly in bars and fancy 
restaurants – but also in casinos and concert halls and bordello and 
trains and hotel rooms and ....
Best summary ever given of that book – 
that’s why you are right to say that they always bitch about their 
pilotless existence and its lack of dramatic development – plots are 
for dead people anyway – and dramatic development only happens 
in pathetic best-sellers –
75EPILOG[ICAL] ENCOUNTERS
page 10 [58–59] has become unreadable 
the distinction you make between Moinous who always elaborates 
and Namredef who always interprets were played in the German 
radio play adapted from this novel by two actors who acted like 
Gogo & Didi – 
N & M as I call them are clowns – I once wrote something asking 
what ever happened to them – I cannot resist showing it to you – I 
go get it –
WHATEVER HAPPENED TO M & N
hey fed ...  wake up ... wake up ... we want to ask you something ... 
you see ... for years we’ve been wondering whatever happened to M 
& N aft er they vanished ... you know ... or as you put it so well your-
self then ... aft er they faded back into your subconscious ... remem-
ber ... right there in that  old dusty chamber of departure ... aft er M 
& N told you what had happened at the spaceport and how the Old 
Man ... well you know the story ...
yes ... we’ve oft en wondered  whatever happened to these two old 
farts ... aft er they vanished ... and you fell asleep on the sofa ...
we would like to know what’s doing with them ... that pseudocou-
ple ... as you called them ...  echoing Sam’s M & C ...  when was it ... 
when was it we last saw them ... 81 ... 82 ... I mean the year of their 
glorious appearance ... and their pathetic disappearance ... hey ... 
these two guys didn’t last long ... 82 ... wasn’t it ... ah what a year it 
was ... well a good year perhaps for them two bums ... but for us 
what a stinking year ... one of the worst ... do you remember ...
tell us fed ... have you seen them ... heard from them ... are they still 
there ... silent ... motionless in your subconscious ... dormant so to 
speak ... or have they given sign of life ... of reappearance ...
are they still alive or have they already changed tense ... the way 
these two jokers conducted their life they  could outwit death itself 
... we wouldn’t put it past them to make it to the apocalypse ... just 
to be able to take a picture of it ...
ah those two bums ... M & N ... they were something ...
hey  fed ... do you know anything ... anything of the whereabouts of 
these two chaos-drunk schmucks ... do you have any idea what they 
are doing ... and if they are doing anything ... whatever that may be 
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... do you know where they are doing it ... and how ... and for what 
purpose ... are they well ... successful ... satisfi ed ... are they em-
ployed ... and do we dare ask ... do we dare ask at the risk of being 
ridiculous ... are they happy ...
if you know anything fed ... anything at all ... about Ominous & 
Namredef ... please let us know ... let the rest of us know... there are 
so many of us who were so fond ... and are still ... of these two clowns 
... we urge you to let us know ... we want so much to know ... to hear 
... the rest of their story ...
that passage you quote from TTV at the bott om of page 9 [57] where 
they all talk together in the fi rst person – one could call that pure 
linguistic cacophony – 
the director of Indiana U. Press who originally published TTV once 
wrote me to deplore that the book was not selling very well – and 
the reason for that -- he claimed – was because of the way fi t was 
punctuated – noone has every paid att ention to those litt le comas 
and wondered what they were doing there ,,,,,,,
it must be irritating to many readers when Federman – the real one 
– the one with the Capital lett er intrudes into the story and explains 
things to the readers – reveal that M & N  are Jewish but that they 
are only incidental in this story ...  
Federman always shows up to undermine everything – 
He is incurable –
page 12 [59] raises enormous questions.
Amazing, I wrote in the margin, how the Old man oft en speaks like 
Federman – for instance when he explains to M & N what the book 
he wrote is all about – the book that is missing from this book – the 
voice in the closet –
which, which by the way, was part of the original manuscript of TTV 
– but the same director of Indiana U. Press refused to publish the 
book with those 20 unreadable pages – even when I suggested that 
we do not number these pages so the reader can skip over if he is 
irritated by these 20 unreadable pages – but the director refused – I 
would love someday to publish a special edition of the original 
manuscript – I wish there would also be included beside the text of 
the voice in the closet – the text I put on my blog recently entitled – 
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“Report from the World Federation of Displaced Writer” – which 
was one of the chapters of TTV – oh well – 
page 12 [59] raised the crucial question of – what if nobody reads – 
read this story – Federman is so aware of this – that in everything he 
writes he inscribes a reader or many readers so that there can be an 
ear or many ears to hear what he is saying – the implied reader who 
becomes implicated in the story – as it is said somewhere in TTV – 
we were all and are still implicated in this sordid aﬀ air –
Camelia absolutely brilliant this move to the Federman blog – sup-
pose one could discuss the blog as being part of the Federman oeu-
vre – another genre – another means of telling the story – the same 
old story – but in a diﬀ erent mode – a true collage of the old and the 
used and the abused with the new and yet to be invented – in order 
to involve all the visitors of the blog into his Jewishness –
I hope your lecture is well received in Romania – maybe the Roma-
nian translation will become a best-seller – and I will be caught with 
my pants down – confronting the world bareass – as the litt le boy 
did in the closet – 
Thank you Camelia for inspiring this delirium – 
–  Love, Raymond
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Dear Raymond,
CHECKMATE
For Moinuous and Namredef
Ola, ola, ola, bola, bola, bola. This is not exactly Parsifal. Moinous 
and Namredef like Parsifal. Aft er a lot of singing, there is a lot of dy-
ing. “I don’t want to go to Dachau,” I tell them. I just want the sing-
ing. Namredef blurts at me and almost tells me to go fuck myself. 
“Don’t get so worked up,” he says, “I’m Jewish too, you know,” he 
further says. “Ya, sure,” I say, and start thinking about what would 
have happened to Malcolm X’s philosophy had he gone to Europe to 
visit the old concentration camps instead of Mecca. I’m gett ing two-
fold vibrations. I wonder if Federman’s family had a brief encounter 
with Max Ernst and Peggy Guggenheim while in there, at that place, 
the place that Wagner never wanted to mention. Peggy and Max got 
out. Then Max married Peggy and then he married that American 
who still wants a lot of colors in her dreams. I see them playing chess 
in one of Inverarity’s framed photographs. Malcolm said: “Be peace-
ful, be courteous, obey the law, respect everyone; but if someone 
puts his hand on you, send him to the cemetery.” Moinous and 
Namredef understand this very well, but only when pronounced in 
another language. They love their reactions to such statements to 
end with Halleluiah and Amen, but since they are more cultivated 
than most Baptists, they like an ending that goes Latin. Thus their fa-
vorite is: nec plus ultra. Oy, boy! Before the king goes into checkmate, 
the Queen gives him a kiss under their gazes. M & N approve.
–  Camelia
Dear Camelia, 
M & N APPROVE 150%
–  big hug, Raymond
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Premembering Time – Archiving Space
Elias: 
At this point it might just as well be revealed. How did these two meet, 
Elias and Federman, the curious reader might ask? To begin with, it was a 
textual, then a virtual, and then an other thing. Federman discovered in 
2004, the year of the Karlstad conference, that I had been writing on him. 
So he wanted my texts. I indulged, of course. Here’s a short response to 
another draft  that sparked his imagination. This second inédit text reprint-
ed here is meant to perform Federman’s concept of “premembering” – re-
membering the future in the past, or prophesying in an inverse order, to be 
more precise. 
As Federman’s text focuses on geographies – we get born, we live, we 
die – the question that one poses as a premembered act: how do we get 
from there to here, or where do we go from here, or must we absolutely go 
somewhere? becomes increasingly signifi cant. In light of such threefolded-
ness, it makes sense to be reminded, as Federman does, of where the casi-
nos are. What is fascinating about casinos is the fact that they are places that 
particularly those that pose existential questions can enjoy. Casinos oﬀ er a 
space for the player to eat, make strategic moves, and simply experience 
being ‘in the meanwhile’. In this transit time, memory can be forgott en, 
and history can be archived. Here I would advance the claim that what 
enables writers such as Federman to formulate statements that entangle 
criticism and fi ction, fi ction and reality, “really fi ctitious” discourses with 
“fi ctitiously real” fi ctions, and ultimately biography and autobiography, is 
‘the meanwhile.’ 
Meanwhile it is then. Thus we quote by stealing through permission:
Federman: 
I just made an incredible discovery
I’m sitt ing at the kitchen table eating a sandwich of paté with french cor-
nichons au vinaigre et drinking un verre de cidre, and while eating I’m read-
ing the article I just got from Camelia Elias – a professor at the University 
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of Aalborg in Denmark. The article is called “H(a)unting Potentialities in 
Federman’s Frenzies.” So I’m reading while chewing my sandwich, and on 
page 2, I read this passage from Take It or Leave It which Camelia is quoting 
to illustrate what would have happened if Federman had not left  himself 
open to other possibilities. I am reading, reading that passage  aloud to 
bring it back to life.
Take my case for instance.  What do you think I would be today if it were 
not for Hitler? Do you know what I would be today?  I mean if nothing had 
happened.  No war, no occupation, no collaboration, no deportation, no 
extermination – no Holocaust.
I stop reading a moment and mumble to myself. Aloud. Federman you’re 
a fucking good writer. Look at that style. That succession of words that 
rime and how they explode aft er the litt le hesitation of the – into the Holo-
caust. I smile and continue reading aloud. This time with a Parisian ac-
cent.
Yes, do you know what I would be today?  A tailor. A litt le Jewish tailor slav-
ing in a tailor shop on Boulevard des Italiens in Paris ...
I stop reading and repeat Boulevard des Italiens.
And suddenly it hits me. Everybody these days, in France, in Germany, 
and other places in the world, including Denmark now, is trying to replace 
Federman’s story into history in order to fi nd out who he is, and why he 
writes the way he does.
But as I stop and repeat Boulevard des Italiens, it comes to me that it is 
now with history but with geography that one will understand who feder-
man is and why he writes the way he does.
Throughout his fi ction – his stories – Federman has given a quantity of 
addresses and geographical locations.  Specifi c addresses.  Street names. 
Places in cities and in the countryside. Villages. Town. Cities. Churches & 
monuments. Countries. And even space colonies. And no one has ever 
paid att ention to these geographical indications.
 
81EPILOG[ICAL] ENCOUNTERS
These landmarks. There lies the real story, in those addresses, those lo-
cations.
Why, one should ask, did Federman decide, when he wrote that pas-
sage, that he would have ended at a litt le Jewish tailor on Boulevard des It-
aliens.  Why there or not somewhere else in Paris. What does Boulevard des 
Italiens signify for Federman. We know what 4 rue Louis Roland means. He 
has oft en enough given his home address in Montrouge for those who 
might be interested to see where it all started. I mean the story.
So many countries are mentioned in Federman’s fi ction. So many cities. 
Streets. Locations. And so many casinos too, one should not forget.
So there I am fi nishing my sandwich when this hits me.  I immediately 
call Larry McCaﬀ ery to explain all this to him.  I even read him the passage 
from TIOLI.  And Larry, as always when I throw a mad idea at him, says 
it’s terrifi c, and so I tell Larry to sit his ass in front of his computer and start 
writing an article called “Federman’s Geography.”
And Larry says he will.  But can I trust him?  Maybe I should write 
“Federman’s Geography” myself. This would save Larry, or whoever picks 
on the idea, a lot of travel expenses, because by necessity whoever writes 
“Federman’s Geography” would have to travel to all these place to fi nd the 
facts of that specifi c location.  I know exactly why such and such addresses 
were given. Or such places in a city. For instance the Ritz Hôtel where Fe-
derman put Aunt Rachel when she came to Paris from Senegal. Why the 
Ritz? Why not the George Cinq? These are delicate questions that only 
Federman can answer.
But will he tell us? That remains the mystery of Federman’s fi ction.
~~~
